Labor Constraints to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Burundi
How to cite
Swanson, Nicholas; Cefala, Luisa; Ndayikeza, Michel Armel; Naso, Pedro. 2022. "Labor Constraints to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Burundi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9060-4.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan countries is low despite the existence of technologies available to farmers that might profitably increase yields. In this project, we propose that labor market frictions constrain the diffusion of new agricultural technologies. Specifically, we argue that take-up of new agricultural technologies might hinge upon the availability of a rural labor force skilled in these technologies, and that farmers may underinvest in training others in these skills if they cannot fully appropriate the returns of this training. We design an RCT in partnership with the NGO “One Acre Fund” in Burundi (OAF) to test the hypotheses that 1) contracting frictions that prevent farmers from fully appropriating returns from training contribute to inefficiently low level of training on these technologies in equilibrium and 2) that encouraging training and the increasing the stock of skilled workers can increase the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies.
Intervention
We use two interventions that are both designed to increase the return to farmers for undertaking the training of village laborers in improved agricultural planting practices.
• Treatment 1 – Financial Incentives: We offer One Acre Fund farmers financial incentives if they spend a minimum amount of time ¬training a laborer in the village in how to use the improved agricultural technology (planting practices)
• Treatment 2 – Labor Insurance: In a smaller sample of villages, we tell farmers that if they train the laborer, the team will ensure that the worker will work for the farmer for two days at the prevailing wage of a laborer that does unskilled labor in the village.
Experimental design
In the experiment, we invite a sample of experienced farmers – who master our planting technology and are, on average, net buyers of labor – to select a potential laborer who does not know the improved agricultural planting practices.
We then randomize farmers (at the village (sous-colline) level) into one of three treatments:
• Treatment 1 – Financial Incentives : We offer One Acre Fund farmers financial incentives if they spend a minimum amount of time training a laborer in the village in how to use the improved agricultural technology (planting practices)
• Treatment 2 – Labor Insurance : In a smaller sample of villages, we tell farmers that if they train the laborer, the team will ensure that the worker will work for the farmer for two days at the prevailing wage of a laborer that does unskilled labor in the village.
• Control – Farmers are given an unconditional financial incentive to farmers equivalent to the conditional incentive given to farmers in Treatment 1. It is suggested to them that they could train the laborer they brought in the planting practices but no further incentives are given.
We then construct our sample as follows. We randomly sample farmers and workers who take part in the training. This sample is used to measure the returns to training for the trainers and trainees.
In addition, we sample other individuals from the same village (sous-colline) who do not participate in the training, which we call our “spillover sample”. In this sample, we oversample individuals who have previously hired laborers to work on their fields.
Design details
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