Labor Constraints to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Burundi

How to cite

Swanson, Nicholas; Cefala, Luisa; Ndayikeza, Michel Armel; Naso, Pedro. 2022. "Labor Constraints to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Burundi." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009060. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9060-4.2

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Nicholas Swanson* , Luisa Cefala , Michel Armel Ndayikeza , Pedro Naso

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009060
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9060-4.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-12-01 – 2022-11-30
Countries
Burundi (Murumvya, Gitega)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9060

Abstract

Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan countries is low despite the existence of technologies available to farmers that might profitably increase yields. In this project, we propose that labor market frictions constrain the diffusion of new agricultural technologies. Specifically, we argue that take-up of new agricultural technologies might hinge upon the availability of a rural labor force skilled in these technologies, and that farmers may underinvest in training others in these skills if they cannot fully appropriate the returns of this training. We design an RCT in partnership with the NGO “One Acre Fund” in Burundi (OAF) to test the hypotheses that 1) contracting frictions that prevent farmers from fully appropriating returns from training contribute to inefficiently low level of training on these technologies in equilibrium and 2) that encouraging training and the increasing the stock of skilled workers can increase the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies.

Intervention

We use two interventions that are both designed to increase the return to farmers for undertaking the training of village laborers in improved agricultural planting practices.

• Treatment 1 – Financial Incentives: We offer One Acre Fund farmers financial incentives if they spend a minimum amount of time ¬training a laborer in the village in how to use the improved agricultural technology (planting practices)
• Treatment 2 – Labor Insurance: In a smaller sample of villages, we tell farmers that if they train the laborer, the team will ensure that the worker will work for the farmer for two days at the prevailing wage of a laborer that does unskilled labor in the village.

Experimental design

In the experiment, we invite a sample of experienced farmers – who master our planting technology and are, on average, net buyers of labor – to select a potential laborer who does not know the improved agricultural planting practices.

We then randomize farmers (at the village (sous-colline) level) into one of three treatments:

• Treatment 1 – Financial Incentives : We offer One Acre Fund farmers financial incentives if they spend a minimum amount of time training a laborer in the village in how to use the improved agricultural technology (planting practices)
• Treatment 2 – Labor Insurance : In a smaller sample of villages, we tell farmers that if they train the laborer, the team will ensure that the worker will work for the farmer for two days at the prevailing wage of a laborer that does unskilled labor in the village.
• Control – Farmers are given an unconditional financial incentive to farmers equivalent to the conditional incentive given to farmers in Treatment 1. It is suggested to them that they could train the laborer they brought in the planting practices but no further incentives are given.

We then construct our sample as follows. We randomly sample farmers and workers who take part in the training. This sample is used to measure the returns to training for the trainers and trainees.

In addition, we sample other individuals from the same village (sous-colline) who do not participate in the training, which we call our “spillover sample”. In this sample, we oversample individuals who have previously hired laborers to work on their fields.

Design details

Randomization method
Office by computer
Randomization unit
Village (sous-colline)
Clusters
~90 villages
Observations
In each village we sample 40-55 individuals: 15 Trainers 15-30 Spillover 10 Trainee
Arms
10% Treatment 2 and the remainder split between Treatment 1 and Control.
Primary outcomes
Primary Outcomes • First stage (at training): o Does farmer train laborer (spends certain amount of time training laborer during training session)? o Perfomance of laborer in conducting improved planting practices under time pressure (incentivized task). This mimics the real work conditions laborers face when hired by a farmer. Post Training: We focus on three classes of outcomes after our intervention: 1. Whether the improved agricultural technology (planting practices) are adopted by farmers 2. Whether a laborer is hired to conduct the improved agricultural technology (planting practices) 3. Total earnings and days worked of workers selected to be trained as part of the project We describe these in more detail below: a. Adoption: a. The training focuses on two modern planting practices: 1) correct spacing of plants, 2) correct dosage and application of fertilizer and compost. Our primary outcome will be spacing because this outcome we are able to conduct field audits to verify the self-reports. We focus on beans – the main crop in the current planting season and the one for which the farmers received the training. We also look at other crops for which spacing can also apply (maize and potatoes) as robustness. b. Labor demand: We measure: a. Whether and how many days an individual hires a laborer to do the improved agricultural practices b. Whether and how many days an individual hires someone invited to be trained c. In T2 only – we measure whether the worker for the individual that trained them, and what work that individual did via self-reports and direct observations. c. Labor supply We measure days worked and earnings during the agricultural season In addition, if we see effects at this stage we will also measure yields and profits at the end of the agricultural season
Secondary outcomes
Secondary outcomes: a. Adoption: a. We plan to also look at the number of plots with self-reported adoption of correct dosage practices. Since this measure is not verifiable, we consider it a secondary outcome b. We will also look at area planted with the improved agricultural technology b. Labor supply a. We will explore days worked and earnings by the type of work done (modern planting techniques vs. traditional, other jobs)

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Keywords