Social Dilemma Aversion and Information Avoidance
How to cite
Bopp, Fabian. 2022. "Social Dilemma Aversion and Information Avoidance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009057. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9057-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Many studies document that some people ignore information, even though this information would be instrumental for their decision-making. This behavior was often attributed to self-image concerns (Grossmann and VanderWeele 2017). A recent study by Exley and Kessler (2021) however finds that indeed self-image concerns play their role, but a large share of the ignorance behavior is still unexplained. In this study, we will explore whether people instrumentally ignore information to avoid a social dilemma situation. Our design is based on the hidden information game by Dana et al. (2007). To answer our question we reduce the size of the dilemma situation in the experiment.
Intervention
To show that social dilemma aversion can explain ignorance, we aim to reduce the tradeoff situation in the dilemma without changing other elements of the game. To reduce the possible tradeoff, we using two different approaches implement an additional mediocre option to the hidden information game by Dana et al. (2007) and thereby eliminate the worst possible dilemma situation.
T0 describes the baseline hidden information game as described
T1 consists of adding an additional third option, which domiates the worst option in the dilemma situation.
T2 of replacing the worst option in the dilemma situaton.
Experimental design
The design is based on the hidden information treatment in the moral wiggle room game by Dana et al. (2007). In the game a decision maker has to choose between option. Depending on the unkown state of the world of the interests either being alignd or conflicting one option is selfish and the other prosocial. The player can reveal the state of the world for free. In the treatment a mediocre option is added to the game. After informing the potential size of the tradeoff situation is reduced as the in the initial game worst option is dominated and becomes irrelevant (T2) or not even existing anymore (T1). If the aversion of being in such an unpleasant situation drives information avoidance, we should see less ignorance behavior in the game with the mediocre option.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.