Contract Enforcement in a Stateless Economy - Pilot
How to cite
Mehmood, Sultan; Ali, Bakhtawar; Chen, Daniel. 2022. "Contract Enforcement in a Stateless Economy - Pilot." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009050. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9050-1.4
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this paper, we study contract enforcement in the illegal gambling market of Pakistan as gamblers make high-stakes betting decisions without the state enforcing contracts. Our experimental intervention randomly assigns gamblers with additional week to honor their book bets –a contract that allows them to pay back the week after and to a treatment arm that makes blacklisting from betting market salient in the contract. We observe the pattern of repayment by gamblers in absence of any state authority enforcing these contracts. We also investigate two potential mechanisms behind the blacklisting 1) imposition of reputational costs in case of nonpayment 2) collusion utilization in case of non-payment. The mechanism underpinning the blacklisting is evaluated via a factorial design: we rerandomize gamblers into a treatment arm that imposes reputation costs in event of non-payment or informs the collusion by informing the race “guild” about the non-repayment. Finally, we examine the impact of a much-used decision aid, odds and historical data relevant to the bet, to investigate whether reducing uncertainty about the outcome affect the decision to bet. We observe winnings and losses of gamblers, payback rates and collect rich set of behavioral data in the form of strategic dilemmas on risk, confidence, cooperation and coordination.
Intervention
T1: Give an opportunity to sign a book bet contract with the gambler with additional time to payback (2 weeks to payback relative to status quo of one week repayment standard book bet contract)
T2: Blacklisting Clause embedded within the status quo book bet contract of payment the week after. The mechanism underpinning the blacklisting is evaluated via a factorial design:
T2a: Reputation Cost Imposed via making the "defaulters" public
T2b: Collusion Utilization by informing the Race Club Guild.
T2c: No Reputational Cost Imposed, Race Club Guild Not Informed.
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet embedded within the "handicap" decision aid
C: Status quo - Opportunity to place a book bet with the status quo contract allowing to payback a week after and no decision-aid provided
Experimental design
We will randomly allocate 16000 gamblers at the Annual Lahore Race Derby into four groups of 4000 gamblers each:
T1: Give an opportunity to sign a book bet contract with the gambler with additional time to payback (2 weeks to payback relative to status quo of one week repayment standard book bet contract)
T2: Blacklisting Clause embedded within the status quo book bet contract of payment the week after. The mechanism underpinning the blacklisting is evaluated via a factorial design:
T2a: Reputation Cost Imposed via making the "defaulters" public
T2b: Collusion Utilization by informing the Race Club Guild.
T2c: No Reputational Cost Imposed, Race Club Guild Not Informed.
T3: Provide for free a decision aid containing odds and historical data relevant to bet embedded within the "handicap" decision aid
C: Status quo - Opportunity to place a book bet with the status quo contract allowing to payback a week after and no decision-aid provided
Design details
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