Outcome bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting
How to cite
Loewenfeld, Moritz. 2022. "Outcome bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009044. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9044-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
I consider a setting of delegated risk taking. Agents choose between a first-order stochastically dominant and a dominated lotteries. Principals observe choices and outcomes and then decide whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. The goal of this experiment is to study whether outcome bias (OB), that is a tendency to condition bonus payments on outcomes, can shape the incentives faced by agent and thereby their choices. In particular, I seek to address the following research questions. 1) Can outcome bias in bonus payments induce incentives to choose ex-ante inferior lotteries? 2) Do agents adjust their choices accordingly, i.e. can outcome bias induce more choices of first-order stochastically dominated lotteries?
Intervention
I will run a lab experiment.
A detailed description of the experimental design can be found in the document "Design_PAP.pfd".
Experimental design
The experiment consists of three parts. In part I, agents make a number of decisions between two lotteries on behalf of the principals. Principals decide whether to award a bonus to the agent or not. In Part II, participants make a number of choices that include the social value orientation task and lottery choices for themselves. Part III consists of a questionnaire. For a detailed description of the experimental design, please refer to the document "Design_PAP.pfd".
Design details
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