Outcome bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting

How to cite

Loewenfeld, Moritz. 2022. "Outcome bias and risk taking in a principal agent setting." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009044. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9044-1.0

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Moritz Loewenfeld*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009044
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9044-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-03-10 – 2022-03-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D81
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9044

Abstract

I consider a setting of delegated risk taking. Agents choose between a first-order stochastically dominant and a dominated lotteries. Principals observe choices and outcomes and then decide whether to award a bonus payment to the agent. The goal of this experiment is to study whether outcome bias (OB), that is a tendency to condition bonus payments on outcomes, can shape the incentives faced by agent and thereby their choices. In particular, I seek to address the following research questions. 1) Can outcome bias in bonus payments induce incentives to choose ex-ante inferior lotteries? 2) Do agents adjust their choices accordingly, i.e. can outcome bias induce more choices of first-order stochastically dominated lotteries?

Intervention

I will run a lab experiment.
A detailed description of the experimental design can be found in the document "Design_PAP.pfd".

Experimental design

The experiment consists of three parts. In part I, agents make a number of decisions between two lotteries on behalf of the principals. Principals decide whether to award a bonus to the agent or not. In Part II, participants make a number of choices that include the social value orientation task and lottery choices for themselves. Part III consists of a questionnaire. For a detailed description of the experimental design, please refer to the document "Design_PAP.pfd".

Design details

Randomization method
By computer.
Randomization unit
The treatment is randomized at the session level. The role (principal or agent) is randomized at the participant level.
Clusters
280 participants in a total of up to 31 sessions (depending on recruitment).
Observations
280 participants.
Arms
140 participant in each of the two experimental conditions. 70 participants in each of the four cells (Agent, Principal)x(OB, NOB).
Primary outcomes
Principal's bonus decisions and agents' lottery choices. A detailed description of the outcome variables and their construction can be found in the document "Design_PAP.pfd".

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Keywords