Exploring the Determinants of Central Bank Credibility
How to cite
Mcmahon, Michael. 2022. "Exploring the Determinants of Central Bank Credibility." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009026. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9026-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Managing expectations via central bank communication has become a primary component of monetary policy. A necessary condition for effective communication is central bank credibility. Despite this, we know surprisingly little about the determinants and properties of credibility. This paper aims to fill this gap by introducing a novel experimental framework that allows for nuanced study of central bank credibility. We employ this framework to study how variations in a central bank’s recent inflation forecasting performance influences subjects’ perceptions of the bank’s credibility.
Intervention
We study how the timing and magnitude of central bank forecasting errors impact the perceived credibility of the central bank. We first expose participants to a 12-quarter history of realized inflation alongside corresponding central bank forecasts. After viewing this history, participants form their own inflation forecast (our elicitation captures information about the first three central moments of subjects’ inflation expectations) for the next quarter (quarter 13). We then reveal the central bank’s quarter-13 inflation forecast and allow subjects to update their own inflation forecast (or not). We measure central bank credibility as the degree to which subjects update their forecast in the direction of the central bank’s forecast. We normalize this measure so that we may compare it cleanly across different economic histories.
Experimental design
We use a within-subjects design to study how the timing and magnitude of central bank forecasting errors impact the perceived credibility of the central bank. To do this, we first expose participants to a 12-quarter history of realized inflation alongside corresponding central bank forecasts. After viewing this history, participants form their own inflation forecast (our elicitation captures information about the first three central moments of subjects’ inflation expectations) for the next quarter (quarter 13). We then reveal the central bank’s quarter-13 inflation forecast and allow subjects to update their own inflation forecast (or not). We measure central bank credibility as the degree to which subjects update their forecast in the direction of the central bank’s forecast. We normalize this measure so that we may compare it cleanly across different economic histories.
We introduce treatment variation via the economic histories that precede participant forecasts. We vary whether the bulk of central bank forecast errors in the 12-quarter history occur early, occur late, or are distributed consistently. Our interest is in how the timing of errors impacts the degree to which subjects incorporate the central bank’s quarter-13 forecast into their own updated forecast. We also vary whether central banks have a relatively good or bad forecasting history (I.e. we vary the average absolute forecasting error).
This design yields a total of 12 treatments. Each subject experiences either the good forecast or bad forecast history but never both. For that history, a subject experiences only one of the six permutations of Early, Late, and Consistent forecast histories. This within-subject design ensures that idiosyncratic characteristics (over confidence, etc.) cannot drive effects. Further, treating each permutation as its own treatment ensures we are able to net out of our final results any ordering or learning effects.
Design details
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