Competition and Equal Pay Policy: Experimental Evidence

How to cite

Hu, Hairong; Kubitz, Gregory. 2022. "Competition and Equal Pay Policy: Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0009009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9009-3.2

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Hairong Hu* , Gregory Kubitz

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0009009
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.9009-3.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-09-21 – 2024-10-05
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/9009

Abstract

The Equal Pay Law mandates that firms pay the same wage to workers employed in the same occupation. In this experiment, we aim to investigate the impact of an Equal Pay Policy on hiring discrimination at varying levels of competition in the labour market. We've designed a online experiment where we'll use the concept of a reservation wage to emulate the Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929), thereby introducing competition into the hiring market. The experiment is designed to answer three questions: 1) How does an equal pay policy influence employers' wage decisions for different groups? 2) How does an equal pay policy affect employers' hiring decisions for different groups? 3) Does competition in the labour market influence the impact of the equal pay policy?

Experimental design

This experiment consists of two phases: 1) the preliminary phase, in which we aim to recruit 150 participants to complete a series of anagram tasks; and 2) the main phase, in which we aim to recruit 44 participants for each of the four treatments to complete a hiring task (i.e., 176 participants in total).

In the preliminary phase, participants will be asked to complete five 2-minute anagram tasks individually and paid by piece-rate performance. This phase is designed to generate actual profiles of candidates to be used in the main phase of the experiment. The benefit of using actual profiles is to introduce real consequences for discriminatory behaviour and therefore capture the actual level of employer discrimination (Hedegaard & Tyran, 2018). To construct a balanced candidates pool for the second phase, 75 participants will be recruited from an ethnic minority group (i.e., East Asians) and the remaining 75 will be recruited from the ethnic majority group (i.e., Whites). Out of the five performances, we drop the lowest and the highest scores to form the final candidate profiles. And we randomly choose 2 scores from the rest of 3 scores remaining as the pre-performance score and interview performance score

In the main phase of the experiment, participants will undertake a manager's role to make hiring decisions, using a set of four pre-screened candidate profiles based on data from the preliminary phase. Each participant will be assigned to one of the following four experimental treatments: Individual-Flexible treatment - without the equal pay policy or hiring competition (Treatment 1), Individual-Fixed treatment - with an equal pay policy (requiring employers to offer the same wage to all chosen candidates) but without hiring competition (Treatment 2), Competition-Flexible treatment - with hiring competition (employers compete with each other over wages for each candidate) but without the equal pay policy (Treatment 3), and Competition-Fixed treatment - with both the equal pay policy and hiring competition (Treatment 4). We will recruit only participants from the ethnic majority group to act as employers/managers. Each set of four candidate profiles includes two minority and two majority candidates, randomly selected from the pool collected in the preliminary phase.

The employer/manager will be provided with the interview performances of all four candidates. They will then decide whether or not to hire each candidate and, if they opt to hire, what wage they are willing to offer. Each candidate will have an undisclosed reservation wage. The employer/manager can successfully hire a candidate if their wage offer is higher than the candidate's reservation wage (Treatments 1 and 2), or if their wage offer is higher than both the candidate's reservation wage and the competing manager's wage offer for the same candidate (Treatments 3 and 4). Depending on the treatment, the potential employer/manager can choose to offer an identical wage (Treatments 2 and 4) or different wages to different candidates. Along with interview performances, the potential employer/manager will also be given information about the candidates’ ages, prolific IDs (not their actual IDs), and ethnicity (reflected through their surnames).

Design details

Randomization method
A computer
Randomization unit
individual candidate
Clusters
Each treatment has 44 sessions. So there will be 176 sessions.
Observations
Each session has 16 candidates and 1 participant (manager). The total observations are 4x44x1= 176 participants, and 4x44x16 = 2816 candidates. Each participant finish 4 tasks (named as candidate pool), so total will be 704 pools.
Arms
176 sessions
Primary outcomes
The main outcome of interest is how an equal pay policy impacts the percentage of minority workers being hired and the wage dispersion between the minority and majority workers.
Secondary outcomes
The primary outcome can be broken down into three parts: 1) Impact on Hiring and Selection, 2) Impact on Wage Offers and Payments, and 3) Impact on the overall employment rate and wage payments in different competitive markets. For the first and second parts, we're interested in how the equal pay policy affects differences across ethnic and ability groups. We're operating under the assumption that managers believe the average ability of minority workers is lower than that of majority workers. For the third part, we are interested in to see how the equal pay policy impacts the overall employment rate and wage payments in different competitive markets.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords