Double auction experiment of certified environmental values

How to cite

Ikemoto, Tadahiro; Ida, Takanori; Kamei, Kenju; Kurino, Morimitsu. 2022. "Double auction experiment of certified environmental values." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008855. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8855-1.0

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Tadahiro Ikemoto* , Takanori Ida , Kenju Kamei , Morimitsu Kurino

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008855
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8855-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-01-24 – 2022-02-17
Countries
Japan ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8855

Abstract

We plan to conduct online experimental double auctions of certified environmental values in order to verify whether information on bid and ask prices of other participants will have any impact on bid, ask and market prices. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into three intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price.
Each corporation subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, and will be randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups. The team composition and the assigned treatment condition remain the same throughout the five experiment sessions. Subjects engage in double auctions only in their own teams. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments (random incentive scheme).

Intervention

We will conduct experimental double auctions of certified environmental values. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into 3 intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price. There will be no limitation on price or amount settings. Buyers will be at their own expense. Each subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, with partner matching: the team composition does not change in the experiment. Each team (the unit of double auction market) will be randomly assigned to one of 3 intervention groups. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments.

Experimental design

Experimental auction as described above.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done by assigning computer generated random numbers to participants.
Randomization unit
Each participant will be randomly assigned to an intervention group.
Clusters
We plan to have a total of 192 corporation subjects (168 buyers and 24 sellers). Each of the three intervention groups has 64 subjects. The number of clusters is eight per group. Each cluster, which we call “team” in this document, consists of seven buyers and one seller. The team composition does not change throughout the five consecutive experiment sessions.
Observations
Each team participates in one pre-treatment session and five one-day experimental sessions in their assigned treatment condition. Hence, we collect observations of 144 double-auction markets in total (= 3 intervention groups X 8 teams per intervention groups X 6 days per team)
Arms
Each treatment has 56 buyers and 8 sellers. The number of clusters is eight per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Each deal of five and a pre-treatment sessions.

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Keywords