Double auction experiment of certified environmental values
How to cite
Ikemoto, Tadahiro; Ida, Takanori; Kamei, Kenju; Kurino, Morimitsu. 2022. "Double auction experiment of certified environmental values." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008855. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8855-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We plan to conduct online experimental double auctions of certified environmental values in order to verify whether information on bid and ask prices of other participants will have any impact on bid, ask and market prices. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into three intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price.
Each corporation subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, and will be randomly assigned to one of three intervention groups. The team composition and the assigned treatment condition remain the same throughout the five experiment sessions. Subjects engage in double auctions only in their own teams. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments (random incentive scheme).
Intervention
We will conduct experimental double auctions of certified environmental values. Participants from distinct corporations will be divided into 3 intervention groups. Information on ongoing transactions of all participants in the same group will be shown in the first one during each session but not in the second or third ones. Buyers in the third one will not be able to set the price. There will be no limitation on price or amount settings. Buyers will be at their own expense. Each subject participates in five consecutive one-day experimental sessions (which will be run every two business days). A pre-treatment session will also be run before interventions. Each team consists of seven buyers and one seller, with partner matching: the team composition does not change in the experiment. Each team (the unit of double auction market) will be randomly assigned to one of 3 intervention groups. After the fifth experimental session, one of five sessions will be chosen randomly for payments.
Experimental design
Experimental auction as described above.
Design details
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