Quality upgrading in the street food market: are better infrastructure and training sufficient?
How to cite
Tommasi, Denni; Brown, Caitlin. 2022. "Quality upgrading in the street food market: are better infrastructure and training sufficient?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008797. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8797-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Street vending, the activity of selling goods and services in the streets without having a permanent built-up structure, is a large and growing sector across the developing world: vendors make up between 2 and 24 per cent of total urban informal employment in African, Asian and Latin American cities (Wongtada, 2014; ILO, 2018). Among street vendors, food sellers represent the most visible group as they provide affordable and nutritional food to 2.5 billion consumers every day, especially to those of low- and middle- incomes (FAO, 2007). However, street-food vendors are also considered a threat for public health, as street food is one of the main determinants of foodborne diseases.
Currently, India is the leading country among emerging economies attempting to structurally transform this sector. The 2014 “National Act for Urban Street Vendors” aims to formalize the unorganized street vending sector through a number of regulatory measures, including also recommendations concerning health and hygienic standards for vendors selling food (NPUSV, 2009). However, implementation of this policy has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the lack of compliance and enforcement of regulations and poor targeting of scarce public resources (Daniele, Mookerjee, and Tommasi, 2021). Progress is further complicated by the absence of microeconomic details about the activities conducted by the main actors in this market: street vendors and consumers.
In this project, we take a microeconomic approach and focus specifically on the public health aspects of the ongoing transformation of the street vending sector. In particular, we aim to understand in detail the factors that can influence the production and consumption of safer food in urban street food markets in Kolkata, India. We use this context as our “laboratory” to gain new insights that can be transferred to other cities, states and countries experiencing similar issues in this yet formalized sector.
In collaboration with international and national organizations, we plan to provide (subsidizing) for free health-related infrastructure to a random sample of street-food vendors that are too costly for them to buy and that are not provided by the local authorities. This is an in-kind transfer worth $400 per vendor (roughly, 3-month net income in our context). A second treatment arm will provide additional training on safe food preparation practices, in addition to the infrastructure. The experiment is to test whether this investment is sufficient to sustain a “better equilibrium” in terms of adoption and practices that we can observe and measure concerning the production of safer food.
In addition, we also plan to conduct a comprehensive series of discrete choice experiments on consumers to elicit their preferences and experiences with safe street food. Combining these data, we aim to answer the following set of questions: 1) How safe is street food and its inputs in this market and how stable are these statistics? 2) What is the correlation between food safety, production inputs, safe food handling practices and behaviours? 3) Are prices a signal of higher food safety in different markets? 4) Are poorer consumers more at risk from unsafe street food? 5) What are consumer preferences for safe street food? 6) How do they react to changes in prices and quality of the street food?
Despite the size and importance of the street vending sector, there is relatively little research on the relationship between food safety and its microeconomic determinants, such as production inputs and prices. Our project will fill this gap while providing a complementary analysis to any macroeconomic investigation of the issue. We attempt to bridge two important strands of research which occur in economics and microbiology: namely, work on food safety practices among informal vendors in developing countries and the health impacts of unsafe food.
We build upon the seminal work by Daniele et al (2021), which is the most comprehensive (microeconomic) study on the public health issues surrounding the informal street vending sector. We also expand on the existing microbiological literature that has documented harmful pathogens in street food in developing countries (Abrahale et al. (2019) provides a review) and the work that has documented the extent of unsafe food safety practices among street food vendors (Muinde and Kuria (2005); Chukuezi (2010); Muyanja et al. (2011); Samapundo et al. (2015); among many others).
Intervention
We are providing (subsidizing) for free a set of infrastructure to vendors that are too costly for them to buy and that are not provided by the local authorities either. This is an in-kind transfer worth 400$ per vendor (roughly, 3-month net income in our context). In addition, we also plan to conduct a comprehensive series of discrete choice experiments on consumers to elicit their preferences and experiences with safe street food. The experiment is to test whether this subsidized investment is sufficient to sustain a “better equilibrium” in terms of adoption and practices (that we can observe and measure) concerning the production of safer food. The simple hypothesis underlying our intervention is that this subsidized investment could enable vendors to offer consumers a wider array of desirable and profitable products and services by removing the cost barrier. We intend to verify that this is appropriate in our context by investigating both that vendors have high perceived costs of providing hygienic services at baseline and that consumers have a positive willingness to pay for food that is perceived as more hygienic.
Experimental design
Our design is a stratified (blocked) random assignment with 2 levels. Hence, the sample is divided in clusters of street vendors which are then randomly assigned to different treatment groups, namely: treatment C, T1 and T2. Since the assignment is at the cluster level, all vendors in a particular cluster are assigned to the identical treatment group. The assignment of the treatments, coupled with regular monitoring of their food handling practices throughout the intervention, allows us to observe and identify changes in their behavior. The different treatment groups have different incentive schemes to reward the vendors for improving their practices, allowing us to identify the relative importance of factors that might be prompting their decisions. Finally, a measure of the spatial distance between different clusters allows us to estimate the spillover effects or externalities arising from the treatments.
Design details
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