Energy Policy Preferences and Compensation Policies in Germany

How to cite

Toenshoff, Christina; Mares, Isabela; Scheve, Kenneth. 2021. "Energy Policy Preferences and Compensation Policies in Germany." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008734. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8734-1.0

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Christina Toenshoff* , Isabela Mares , Kenneth Scheve

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008734
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8734-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-09-20 – 2021-09-24
Countries
Germany ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8734

Abstract

Transitioning away from carbon-intensive to more renewable energy sources is one key lever through which countries can mitigate climate change. At the same time, such energy transitions create losers among consumers, investors and workers. In this study, we conduct three survey experiments designed to test how compensation measures offered by the government change public support for a transition to greener energy sources. The survey is fielded in Germany, just before the 2021 federal election.

Intervention

Voluntary members of Respondi's repondent pool in Germany were contacted and asked to complete an online survey from their computer. The survey contained three experiments that tested how individuals' climate policy preferences change with information on compensation policies.

For clarity, we assign numbers to the experiments in our pre-analysis plan. However, the order in which experiments appeared to survey respondents was randomized. The three experiments contained the following interventions:

Experiment 1:
The first experiment is a conjoint-experiment that presents individuals with a choice between two hypothetical candidates for the upcoming federal election. The experiment randomly varies 5 candidate characteristics: party, gender, position on energy policy, position on social policy, and position on migration policy.

Experiment 2:
The second experiment uses a vignette design to test the effect of different forms of compensation on support for the energy transition. Respondents are asked to watch short videos that present them with information on the exit from coal. Videos for the treatment groups contain additional information on different forms of compensation.

Experiment 3:
The third experiment combines a vignette experiment with a conjoint experiment. First, all respondents are asked to read a short text on carbon pricing. The treatment groups each read an additional paragraph on compensation or competitiveness measures. After reading the information on carbon pricing, respondents are presented with a conjoint experiment, which asks them to pick one of two hypothetical climate policy plans. The plans randomly vary along four dimensions: cost, effectiveness, compensation measures and competitiveness measures.

Experimental design

The survey contained three experiments with three interventions (the order in which the experiments appear to participants is randomized):

Experiment 1:
The first experiment is a conjoint-experiment that presents individuals with a choice between two hypothetical candidates for the upcoming federal election. The experiment randomly varies 5 candidate characteristics: party, gender, position on energy policy, position on social policy, and position on migration policy. We are particularly interested in the effect of energy policy positions on electoral support. Energy policy positions are drawn from a set of four possible positions: (1) candidate wants to slow down the energy transition to more renewable sources of energy, (2) candidate wants the energy transition to proceed at its current speed, (3) candidate wants the energy transition to proceed at its current speed and demands government compensation for low-income households, (4) candidate wants the energy transition to proceed at its current speed and demands compensation for energy-intensive industry to ensure competitiveness. The possible factors for all five levels are presented in the attached pre-analysis plan. Each respondent repeats the comparison process of this experimental design five times.

Experiment 2:
The second experiment, we use a vignette design to test the effect of different forms of compensation on support for the energy transition. In this experiment, we focus on the transition away from coal, as this particular policy goes hand in hand with a variety of compensation measures. Respondents are asked to watch short videos that present them with information on the exit from coal. First, all participants receive information on Germany’s current plans to exit coal. Among other things, the text mentions all the societal groups that could be considered losers of the exit from coal – consumers, workers, investors, and those living in coal regions. The control group receives no further information. Three treatment groups receive information on different forms of compensation: compensation for consumers (Treatment 1), compensation for investors (Treatment 2), compensation for workers (Treatment 3) and compensation for coal regions as a whole (Treatment 4). Links to the videos and English translations of their transcripts can be found in the attached pre-analysis plan.

Experiment 3:
The third experiment tests individuals’ willingness to pay for climate policy. Respondents are randomly assigned to the control group (C), or one of two treatment groups: the compensation treatment (T1) or the competitiveness treatment (T2). First, all respondents are asked to read a short text on carbon pricing. The treatment groups each read an additional paragraph. After reading the information on carbon pricing, respondents are presented with a conjoint experiment, which asks them to pick one of two hypothetical climate policy plans. The plans randomly vary along four dimensions: cost, effectiveness, compensation measures and competitiveness measures. The exact wording of vignette treatments and values of the conjoint experiment can be found in the attached pre-analysis plan. While individuals only read one excerpt at the beginning of the experiment, the conjoint task is repeated five times.

Design details

Randomization method
Computer software
Randomization unit
individual respondents
Clusters
2000 individuals
Observations
2,000 for experiment 2. As respondents repeat each of the conjoint comparisons 5 times, the number of observations for experiments 1 and 3 will be 20,000 (2000 individuals, 5 comparisons between 2 plans).
Arms
Experiment 1: 2000 respondents Experiment 2: 400 respondents in control group, 400 respondents in Treatment 1, 400 respondents in Treatment 2, 400 respondents in treatment 3, and 400 respondents in Treatment 4. Experiment 3: 667 respondents in the Control group, 667 respondents in Treatment 1, 667 respondents in Treatment 2.
Primary outcomes
Experiment 1: In experiment 1, our key outcome of interest is the set of individuals' multidimensional preferences for electoral candidates. We are particularly interested in the effect of a candidate's energy policy position on electoral support. Experiment 2: In experiment 2, the key outcome of interest is support for a complete and rapid exit from coal energy. This is measured in two outcome questions, which we use to construct a total of four outcome variables, as detailed below. Experiment 3: In experiment 3, we are interested in the set of individuals' multidimensional preferences on climate policy plans. We further test how information received in the vignette treatments interacts with conjoint characteristics.

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Keywords