Quality Upgrading and Competition - Theory and Evidence from the Coffee Sector in Uganda

How to cite

Bai, Jie; Tang, Yulu; Morton, Russell; Bergquist, Lauren; Morjaria, Ameet. 2022. "Quality Upgrading and Competition - Theory and Evidence from the Coffee Sector in Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008703. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8703-2.0

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Jie Bai* , Yulu Tang , Russell Morton , Lauren Bergquist , Ameet Morjaria

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008703
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8703-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-12-01 – 2024-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8703

Abstract

How do long and potentially imperfectly competitive supply chains affect the incentives that producers face for quality provision in developing countries? We explore this question in the context of coffee in Uganda. International coffee markets often offer large returns to quality management; however, producers in developing countries consistently fall short of these quality standards. We study how the market structure of Uganda’s coffee supply chain affects the transmission of quality incentives up to producers. We measure the quality premium along the supply chain, from downstream exporters to intermediaries to upstream producers. We explore the role of two mechanisms that may diminish the quality premium upstream: one is markdowns resulting from differential market power by quality, and the second is productive substitutability, meaning the ability of downstream agents to make quality investments that substitute for those upstream. To differentiate between these two mechanisms and quantify their role in contributing to the diminishing quality gradient, we conduct experiments that offer randomized coffee production contracts throughout the supply chain (to both traders and farmers). These contracts induce quality-specific demand shocks that allow us to separately identify costs from markdowns, as well as understand how agents along the supply chain would respond to varying quality premia on investment in quality. We use the estimated model to examine the efficiency implications and distributional consequences of barriers to entry and productive substitutability, as well as how they interact to affect quality production and surplus distribution along the chain. Finally, we use the model to investigate counterfactual policies to induce quality upgrading.

Intervention

The aim of this project is to identify variation in quality premiums along the supply chain, from downstream exporters to intermediaries to upstream producers, as well as understand the underlying causes and their efficiency and distributional implications. We partner with a large coffee exporter in Uganda (hereafter referred to as “the company”). We start by mapping out the supply chains emanating from this company and observing how quality premiums vary along the chain (more below). We then conduct randomized control trials with both traders and farmers along those chains. We offer both farmers and traders randomized coffee production contracts – which vary not just in whether they are offered at all, but also the quantity and quality – to induce quality-specific demand shifters. For both, we collect respondent’s “minimum willingness to accept” (WTA) the contract via a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. We will use this experiment to estimate trader costs and markdowns to understand how much of the declining quality premium is due to intermediary market power vs. joint quality production between farmers and traders.

Experimental design

This project includes two parts: 1) detailed data collection on the supply chain network and high-frequency transaction level data and 2) randomized contract offers throughout the supply chain.

We begin by mapping the complete supply chain, from the farm gate to export gate, and collect detailed transaction-level data on prices, quantities, and laboratory quality measures along the chain. We document the layers of domestic intermediation and the price-quality gradient as we move up the supply chain.

We explore the role of two mechanisms that may diminish the quality premium upstream: one is markdowns resulting from differential market power by quality, and the second is productivity substitutability, the ability of downstream agents to make quality investments that substitute for those upstream. To differentiate between these two mechanisms and quantify their role in contributing to the diminishing quality gradient, we conduct experiments that offer randomized coffee production contracts throughout the supply chain (to both traders and farmers). These contracts induce quality-specific demand shocks that allow us to separately identify costs from markdowns, as well as understand how agents along the supply chain would respond to varying quality premia on investment in quality. We use the estimated model to examine the efficiency implications and distributional consequences of barriers to entry and productive substitutability, as well as how they interact to affect quality production and surplus distribution along the chain. Finally, we use the model to investigate counterfactual policies to induce quality upgrading.

Design details

Randomization method
We will begin by mapping out the supply chain network for traders who sell directly to the company (the downstream traders). To do so, we call all the downstream traders to administer a short survey to map out their main areas of operation, i.e., main parishes of purchasing and selling coffee. We will also collect their supplier information, and then call their suppliers to ask about the suppliers’ suppliers, until we reach a farmer. Additionally, we collect information on a randomly selected supplier for a quarter of all downstream suppliers, and follow the same procedure of call that randomly selected supplier and asking about the suppliers’ suppliers until we reach a farmer. We also collect data on the physical market centers where traders store their coffee among the primary parishes where the company is active. At each market center, we perform a census listing exercise where we collect information on all traders active in the market centers. From this listing, we randomly select a subset of parishes and add an additional downstream trader to the supply chain mapping exercise. We then select supply chains to include in the high-frequency transaction level data collection through the season, using both main and randomly selected supply chains. Additionally, we incorporate additional downstream traders selected randomly from the market listing activities, stratified by parish. All agents (traders and farmers) along selected main supply chains will be in the pool that is potentially eligible for the randomized contracts. The randomization of the experimental contracts will come from the BDM mechanism. Conditional on WTA, the award of the contract is randomized through the randomized price scratched off. For each contract, the quality (high vs. low) and quantity (three levels) is also randomized, with quality and quantity assignment stratified by chain length.
Randomization unit
Randomization will occur at the individual respondent level.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
We expect to have about 400 respondents (drawn from 200 supply chains) in the experiments.
Arms
All agents (traders and farmers) along these selected supply chains will be in the pool that is potentially eligible for the randomized contracts. The randomization of the experimental contracts will come through the BDM mechanism. Conditional on WTA, the award of the contract is randomized based on the randomized price scratched off. For each contract, the quality (high vs. low) and quantity (three levels) is also randomized, with quality and quantity assignment stratified by chain length.
Primary outcomes
1. Quality-premium (how price varies by quality) and heterogeneity in this premium along the value chain 2. Quality provision (quantity of each quality type) in response to randomized contracts These outcomes will be measured separately at each point in the value chain
Secondary outcomes
1. Minimum willingness to accept (WTA) the BDM contract 2. Sourcing behavior by traders 3. Processing activities behaviors by farmers and traders

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Keywords