Quality Upgrading and Competition - Theory and Evidence from the Coffee Sector in Uganda
How to cite
Bai, Jie; Tang, Yulu; Morton, Russell; Bergquist, Lauren; Morjaria, Ameet. 2022. "Quality Upgrading and Competition - Theory and Evidence from the Coffee Sector in Uganda." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008703. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8703-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
How do long and potentially imperfectly competitive supply chains affect the incentives that producers face for quality provision in developing countries? We explore this question in the context of coffee in Uganda. International coffee markets often offer large returns to quality management; however, producers in developing countries consistently fall short of these quality standards. We study how the market structure of Uganda’s coffee supply chain affects the transmission of quality incentives up to producers. We measure the quality premium along the supply chain, from downstream exporters to intermediaries to upstream producers. We explore the role of two mechanisms that may diminish the quality premium upstream: one is markdowns resulting from differential market power by quality, and the second is productive substitutability, meaning the ability of downstream agents to make quality investments that substitute for those upstream. To differentiate between these two mechanisms and quantify their role in contributing to the diminishing quality gradient, we conduct experiments that offer randomized coffee production contracts throughout the supply chain (to both traders and farmers). These contracts induce quality-specific demand shocks that allow us to separately identify costs from markdowns, as well as understand how agents along the supply chain would respond to varying quality premia on investment in quality. We use the estimated model to examine the efficiency implications and distributional consequences of barriers to entry and productive substitutability, as well as how they interact to affect quality production and surplus distribution along the chain. Finally, we use the model to investigate counterfactual policies to induce quality upgrading.
Intervention
The aim of this project is to identify variation in quality premiums along the supply chain, from downstream exporters to intermediaries to upstream producers, as well as understand the underlying causes and their efficiency and distributional implications. We partner with a large coffee exporter in Uganda (hereafter referred to as “the company”). We start by mapping out the supply chains emanating from this company and observing how quality premiums vary along the chain (more below). We then conduct randomized control trials with both traders and farmers along those chains. We offer both farmers and traders randomized coffee production contracts – which vary not just in whether they are offered at all, but also the quantity and quality – to induce quality-specific demand shifters. For both, we collect respondent’s “minimum willingness to accept” (WTA) the contract via a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. We will use this experiment to estimate trader costs and markdowns to understand how much of the declining quality premium is due to intermediary market power vs. joint quality production between farmers and traders.
Experimental design
This project includes two parts: 1) detailed data collection on the supply chain network and high-frequency transaction level data and 2) randomized contract offers throughout the supply chain.
We begin by mapping the complete supply chain, from the farm gate to export gate, and collect detailed transaction-level data on prices, quantities, and laboratory quality measures along the chain. We document the layers of domestic intermediation and the price-quality gradient as we move up the supply chain.
We explore the role of two mechanisms that may diminish the quality premium upstream: one is markdowns resulting from differential market power by quality, and the second is productivity substitutability, the ability of downstream agents to make quality investments that substitute for those upstream. To differentiate between these two mechanisms and quantify their role in contributing to the diminishing quality gradient, we conduct experiments that offer randomized coffee production contracts throughout the supply chain (to both traders and farmers). These contracts induce quality-specific demand shocks that allow us to separately identify costs from markdowns, as well as understand how agents along the supply chain would respond to varying quality premia on investment in quality. We use the estimated model to examine the efficiency implications and distributional consequences of barriers to entry and productive substitutability, as well as how they interact to affect quality production and surplus distribution along the chain. Finally, we use the model to investigate counterfactual policies to induce quality upgrading.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.