Disclosure Discrimination
How to cite
Korlyakova, Darya; Rehák, Rastislav; Badalyan, Sona. 2021. "Disclosure Discrimination." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008662. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8662-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this project, we aim to explore the existence of labor market discrimination in a novel context - communication among hiring team members. Widely used correspondence studies focus on discrimination in callbacks or interview invitations, an early stage of the hiring process. However, for instance, Quillian, Lee, and Oliver (2020) document substantial additional discrimination from interview to job offer. Based on discussion in Dobbin and Kalev (2016) and our interviews with professionals from recruitment industry, we hypothesize that human resource assistants, who are often responsible for sharing their notes from interviewing candidates with (hiring) managers, consciously or unconsciously disclose or emphasize different information about candidates depending on candidates’ ethnicity or gender. To test this conjecture, we conduct an online experiment with a representative sample of Czech respondents whom we ask to perform HR assistants’ job. Each assistant sees multiple profiles of workers and can select any information from them. In each profile, we vary exogenously and independently worker’s nationality and gender by manipulating the name. Assistants know that the selected information is intended to be shown to other respondents whom we assign the role of hiring managers. Collecting data from this complementary sample is worthwhile because it will enable us to study the consequences of assistants’ decisions for hiring of females and immigrants at later stages.
Sources
Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2016). Why diversity programs fail. Harvard Business Review, 94(7), 14.
Quillian, L., Lee, J. J., & Oliver, M. (2020). Evidence from field experiments in hiring shows substantial additional racial discrimination after the callback. Social Forces, 99(2), 732-759.
Experimental design
Each experimental subject (assistant) will see 8 workers' profiles (one at a time) and for each of them he/she will be asked to select pieces of information for another randomly matched respondent (manager). The manager will decide how much he or she is willing to pay to hire each of the 8 workers for a financial task.
We have constructed 8 profiles based on actual data from a supplementary survey with workers. We include both high- and low-quality profiles. Profiles contain various information about workers' demographics, his/her education, work experience, certificates (that demonstrate workers' results on real-effort tasks), self-reported skills, etc. Each of the 8 profiles has 4 versions which have identical content but differ in workers’ fictitious names. The exogenous manipulation of names aims to signal gender and nationality. We use 2x2 factorial design and assign workers' profiles to female or male version (dimension 1) and to local (Czech) or immigrant version (dimension 2). We focus on immigrants from former Soviet states and use Russian and Ukrainian names.
Assistants will be incentivized to select information carefully because managers could reward their effort based on the quality of disclosed information. We will also make assistants aware that their decisions may have financial consequences for other respondents. Particularly, hired workers and managers (see below) can receive bonuses.
After the experiment with assistants is completed, we will conduct a supplementary survey with managers. Managers will be responsible for hiring workers for a financial task. More precisely, they will set wages and, if the chosen wage for a particular worker is higher than a randomly generated number, the worker will be hired. One of the 8 hiring decisions will be chosen at random and implemented: the manager will receive a bonus equal to the difference between the worker’s performance on a financial task and the random number and the worker will receive the random number as a bonus. Before making each of the 8 hiring decisions, the manager will see information about the worker from a random assistant. While pairing assistants and managers, we will use fixed matching and assign a different assistant to each manager.
Design details
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