Quotas and the Labor Market

How to cite

Grundner, Stefan; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Gürtler, Oliver; Gürtler, Marc. 2021. "Quotas and the Labor Market." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008604. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8604-2.0

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Stefan Grundner* , Bernd Irlenbusch , Oliver Gürtler , Marc Gürtler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008604
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8604-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-12-01 – 2024-12-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
M51, K31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8604

Abstract

Quotas are often discussed as an engineering tool to combat discrimination in hiring decisions. Their effects within competitive labor markets, however, are not well understood yet. Indeed if quotas for promotions are enforced, a promotion can be a signal of lower ability
for those who are discriminated and can lead to lower wage offers on the labor market. On the one side this might harm those who have high ability and who would have received higher wage offers without quotas. On the other side this might also harm those with low ability, since not having been promoted even though the quota was in place is a very bad signal. We aim to investigate the behavioral effects of these mechanisms. We experimentally investigate the effect of quotas in a competitive labor market. Our setting is based on a model by Waldman (1984) which has been extended to explain discrimination and study quotas by Gürtler and Gürtler (2019). Three employers compete for six employees after promotion signals have been revealed to the market. In a baseline treatment employers and employees belong to the same group. In this setting no discrimination regarding promotions is expected. In a second treatment two groups are induced and endogenous statistical discrimination should occur, i.e., different equilibria should be selected. In a third treatment quotas are added.

Experimental design

In our experiment, we introduce color groups. Each participant is assigned to one color group. Interacting participants might belong to the same or different color groups. Furthermore, participants are assigned a role. They either are employers or employees. Participants are sorted into labor markets such that each labor market includes 3 employers and 6 employees. Each employer is paired with two employees of her labor market. These employees are her current employees. Employees have a randomly assigned ability (high, low), which determines how valuable their work is for the employer. Depending on the employees' ability, employers decide which of their two current employees they want to promote. They have to promote one of them. They cannot promote both. The other employers in the labor market do not observe the ability of employees who they don't employ currently. The promotion decision on the other hand is visible. Also, employers can make a wage offer to their own employees and the other four employees in their labor market. For their own employees they can make the wage offer dependent on their abilities. For the other employees they can make their wage offer only dependent on whether or not the employee is promoted by her original employer. Subsequently, a set of rules decides for whom the employees will work. In the experimental treatments we vary the color group composition of employers and employees. We expect first, that employers are more likely to promote their employees from the same color group if they have the same ability as the current employee from a different color group and second, that employers expect other employers to act alike. Consequently, the expected ability of a promoted employee who belongs to the color group of her employer is lower than the expected ability of a promoted employee who does not belong to the the color group of her employer. We expect to see this difference reflected in wage offers to employees.

Design details

Randomization method
Random assignment of participants to an experiment slot.
Randomization unit
experimental session
Clusters
We do not plan to use clusters in the data analysis
Observations
240 observational units (1 employer + 2 employees), 720 participants
Arms
48 observations per treatment (5 treatments: Baseline, Color groups, Color group with quota rule 1, Color group with quota rule 2, Color group with quota rule 3) from the ORSEE pool of the Cologne Laboratory of Economic Research
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variables are the promotion decision of employers dependent on the treatments and the wage offers to employees. Since we ask employers and employees about their expectations of (other) employers' behavior, we can interpret wage offers dependent on ability/promotion decision and expectations of other employers' wage offers.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords