Two part tariffs, demand uncertainty and risk sharing: From theory to experimental evidence

How to cite

GARAPIN, Alexis; BONROY, Olivier; PASQUIER, Nicolas. 2021. "Two part tariffs, demand uncertainty and risk sharing: From theory to experimental evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008576. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8576-3.0

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Alexis GARAPIN* , Olivier BONROY , Nicolas PASQUIER

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008576
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8576-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-11-15 – 2022-03-21
Countries
France (Auvergne Rhone Alpes)
JEL codes
L14, C90
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8576

Abstract

The economic literature dealing with vertical contracts with two part-tariffs is extensive. However, very few works have considered these contracts in an uncertain environment (see Rey and Tirole, 1986). To our knowledge, there is neither a general theoretical framework nor experimental work that analyze risk sharing in this setting.

First, we elaborate a general theoretical framework incorporating a vertical contract offer with uncertainty about the realisation of the final demand. The contract offerer (Proposer) proposes a two part tariff contract (w, T) to be taken or left to the contract receiver (Responder), with w the variable part and T the fixed part of the contract. The utility functions of the Proposer and the Responder of the contract consider risk aversion and conform to the expected utility theory. For any utility function having the properties of a Von Neuman Morgenstern, the model predicts that w is used to share risk such as w is positive (whereas w is null in a certain environment).

Second, we run a lab experiment in a perfect strangers matching design to assess the model propositons. In the experiment, we control for the subjects' risk aversion by performing a risk test (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). We propose treatments that vary the level of demand uncertainty.

Intervention

The experiment is divided into three different treatments:
- A baseline treatment with no demand uncertainty
- A second treatment with a low level of demand uncertainty
- A third treatment with a high level of demand uncertainty

Experimental design

In the experiment subjects perform first the risk test and then they play the two part tariffs game. In the game, the proposer offers a contract (w, T) and the responder accepts or refuses the contract. The experiment uses an abstract framing. The proposer offers a contract by setting a value for two "instruments" (one instrument corresponds to w, the other one to T). Both Proposer and Responder can simulate the payoffs corresponding to each pair of values.

The subjects are randomly assigned to one out of three different treatments (between subjects design). In each treatment, every subject first performs the risk aversion test. Then they play the game with perfect stranger re-matching in each new round (the role, either Proposer or Responder, is randomly drawn and they keep this role till the end of the game). Before they play, they are informed of the other's lottery choice in the risk test.

Each treatment varies the level of uncertainty (no uncertainty, low uncertainty, high uncertainty).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization made by computer (Hroot)
Randomization unit
Individual (student)
Clusters
Non relevant
Observations
9 sessions for a total of 234 subjects
Arms
78 students per treatment (three treatments)
Primary outcomes
The level of risk aversion as measured by the risk test (Eckel and Grossman test) The contract offered (pair w, T)
Secondary outcomes
Whether the contract is accepted or refused

Materials

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Keywords