A field experiment on financial incentive, social preference, and peer effects to improve parking by bike-sharing users

How to cite

Su, Duan; Wang, Yacan; Soetevent, Adriaan. 2021. "A field experiment on financial incentive, social preference, and peer effects to improve parking by bike-sharing users." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008504. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8504-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Duan Su* , Yacan Wang , Adriaan Soetevent

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008504
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8504-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-09-16 – 2022-01-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93, D12, H23, L9, R41
Secondary IDs
National Natural Science Foundation of China and the Joint Programming Initiative Urban Europe, National Natural Science Foundation of China
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8504

Abstract

Dockless bike-sharing is popular and provides the commuting service for "the last mile of trip". Hellobike company also taps over 450 university markets, where some shared bicycles only serve students and exclusively circulate on university campuses. In this study, we design different treatments that vary in the extent to which they appeal to users’s considerations for other users, to test the role of social preferences in bike-sharing. In a field experiment, we design four treatments: social norms, individual free-ticket, group free-ticket, and feedbacks.

Intervention

Social norms: Use information to tell users what is orderly parking, why important, and how to make orderly parking.
Individual free-ticket: Users will get free tickets to ride for the increase of orderly parking rate.
Group free-ticket: Use free tickets to ride for the subject and her partner and monthly feedbacks to encourage orderly parking.
Feedbacks: Use free tickets to ride for the subject and monthly feedbacks to increase the orderly parking.

Experimental design

During the treatment period, users will be incentivized by social norms, free riding, the interaction of free tickets and social preference, or the interaction of free tickets and feedbacks.

Design details

Randomization method
Stratified randomization with Stata
Randomization unit
Individual user
Clusters
5200 users. In four-campus markets of bike-sharing, we randomly select 6000 users from the Hellobike sample pool. After data cleaning, keep valid subjects 5222. These users will be assigned to the control and treatment groups T1-T5. For T4 and T5, we double the subject size.
Observations
5200 users
Arms
T1 Control: about 746 users T2 Social norms: 746 users T3 Individual free-ticket: 746 users T4 Group free-ticket: 1492 users T5 Feedbacks: 1492 users
Primary outcomes
Change in fraction of bicycles in each treatment group that is parked in crowded areas
Secondary outcomes
The change of social norms and social preference before and after treatment.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords