Inequality with unequal opportunity
How to cite
Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo; Lien, Jaimie. 2022. "Inequality with unequal opportunity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008474. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8474-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We live in a society which values meritocracy, in which people are rewarded by their merit, rather than luck or other factors. Studies show that inequality is more acceptable to individuals when the source is considered as merit (Almas et al., 2020). We are interested in situations where the source of merit is unequal opportunity. Specifically, we investigate individuals’ preference for redistribution when the source of inequality involves unequal opportunity.
Intervention
In all treatments, workers complete a simple task (a multiple-choice quiz), and their initial payment rewards are determined by the specific rules of the treatment, described in detail below. The spectator is provided with a summary which describes the situation faced by workers and the initial payment reward result, and then decides on the final payment for the pair of workers. Workers are informed during their part of the task that their task performance will only determine their reward temporarily, but that they must wait for a spectator to make the final reward allocation decision between them and their paired worker. Regardless of the spectator’s decision, each worker will receive at least $2 for completing their part of the task, and thus each worker will be compensated reasonably for their time spent (approximately 10 to 15 minutes).
We implement four different treatments that allow us to study how random opportunity (both ex-ante and ex-post) affects people’s acceptance of inequality between the two workers. There are two additional treatments in which spectators can decide whether or not to perform a number checking task to reveal the conditions under which workers received their initial reward allocations.
Experimental design
In all treatments, workers complete a simple task (a multiple-choice quiz), and their initial payment rewards are determined by the specific rules of the treatment, described in detail below. The spectator is provided with a summary which describes the situation faced by workers and the initial payment reward result, and then decides on the final payment for the pair of workers. Workers are informed during their part of the task that their task performance will only determine their reward temporarily, but that they must wait for a spectator to make the final reward allocation decision between them and their paired worker. Regardless of the spectator’s decision, each worker will receive at least $2 for completing their part of the task, and thus each worker will be compensated reasonably for their time spent (approximately 10 to 15 minutes).
We implement four different treatments that allow us to study how random opportunity (both ex-ante and ex-post) affects people’s acceptance of inequality between the two workers. There are two additional treatments in which spectators can decide whether or not to perform a number checking task to reveal the conditions under which workers received their initial reward allocations. Our study has a between-subject design, that is, to compare spectators’ redistributive behavior in different treatments, thus each recruited participant only participates in *one* of the treatments described below.
Design details
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