Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution

How to cite

Strulov-Shlain, Avner; Taubinsky, Dmitry; Mollerstrom, Johanna. 2021. "Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008346. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8346-1.0

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Avner Strulov-Shlain* , Dmitry Taubinsky , Johanna Mollerstrom

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008346
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8346-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-10-26 – 2017-06-21
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
C91, D63, D81, H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8346

Abstract

We report the results of an online experiment studying preferences for giving and preferences for group-wide redistribution in small (4-person) and large (200-person) groups. We find that the desire to engage in voluntary giving decreases significantly with group size. However, voting
for group-wide redistribution is precisely estimated to not depend on group size. Moreover, people’s perception of the size of their reference group is malleable, and affects their desire to give. These results suggest that government programs, such as progressive tax-and-transfer systems, can help satisfy other-regarding preferences for redistribution in a way that creating opportunities for voluntary giving cannot.

Intervention

In our online Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) experiment, a total of 1,600 participants made
incentivized choices as “rich” players, in groups with an equal number of rich and poor players. The
“rich” were endowed with 350 cents and the “poor” were endowed with 10 cents. We varied two key
dimensions of the decision-making environment.
First, half of our participants were part of small groups of 4 people, whereas the other half were
in groups of 200 participants. This was varied between participants.
Second, we introduced within-subject variation in the types of giving decisions. The first type
involved an option for individual giving, with the gift distributed equally among all of the poor
participants. The second type involved an individual giving decision where the gift would be assigned
to one randomly chosen poor participant, but in such a way that no poor participant received a gift
from more than one rich participant. We call both of these first two types of decisions “individual
giving” because a participant’s decision to give does not affect transfers from other rich participants.
This is in contrast to our third type of decision, where the rich participants voted on whether a
transfer should be made from all rich participants to all poor participants.
Additionally, we varied the cost of transfers to the poor within-subject, so that each participant
took part in a total of 9 decisions: 3 decision types × 3 different costs of giving. Finally, we varied
the framing of individual giving to one participant. In one frame we described the recipient as a
“matched partner” while in another frame we described the recipient as a “randomly selected person.”
This manipulation was conducted to test the malleability of perceived group size; in particular to
test whether participants who initially started out in larger groups might perceive themselves to be
in a small group of 2 when the recipient is described as a “matched partner,” and thus would more
willing to give.

Experimental design

First, half of our participants were part of small groups of 4 people, whereas the other half were
in groups of 200 participants. This was varied between participants.
Second, we introduced within-subject variation in the types of giving decisions. The first type
involved an option for individual giving, with the gift distributed equally among all of the poor
participants. The second type involved an individual giving decision where the gift would be assigned
to one randomly chosen poor participant, but in such a way that no poor participant received a gift
from more than one rich participant. We call both of these first two types of decisions “individual
giving” because a participant’s decision to give does not affect transfers from other rich participants.
This is in contrast to our third type of decision, where the rich participants voted on whether a
transfer should be made from all rich participants to all poor participants.
Additionally, we varied the cost of transfers to the poor within-subject, so that each participant
took part in a total of 9 decisions: 3 decision types × 3 different costs of giving. Finally, we varied
the framing of individual giving to one participant. In one frame we described the recipient as a
“matched partner” while in another frame we described the recipient as a “randomly selected person.”
This manipulation was conducted to test the malleability of perceived group size; in particular to
test whether participants who initially started out in larger groups might perceive themselves to be
in a small group of 2 when the recipient is described as a “matched partner,” and thus would more
willing to give.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done on Qualtrics with random number generator.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1600 individuals
Observations
1600 individuals
Arms
800 in large groups, 800 in small groups
Primary outcomes
Giving decisions in each scenario described above.

Papers from this trial

  1. Mollerstrom, Johanna and Strulov-Shlain, Avner and Taubinsky, Dmitry, Preferences for Giving Versus Preferences for Redistribution (October 7, 2021). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2021-117, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract= https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3938343#

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Keywords