Economic and Financial Models for Pricing and Setting Sanitation Tariffs for the Benefit of the Urban Poor, Evidence from Burkina Faso

How to cite

Lipscomb, Molly; Johnson, Terence. 2015. "Economic and Financial Models for Pricing and Setting Sanitation Tariffs for the Benefit of the Urban Poor, Evidence from Burkina Faso." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000834. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.834-2.0

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Molly Lipscomb* , Terence Johnson

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000834
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.834-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2014-11-01 – 2017-09-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/834

Abstract

This project is a Randomized Controlled Trial designed to measure the impact of alternative pricing models on access to improved sanitation services in peri-urban West Africa.

The market for improved sanitation services (mechanized desludging in particular) is important: sanitation services have high externalities for the local communities. A government may want to intervene in the market for sanitation services but find it difficult to do so as they are unable to observe values for the consumers or costs for the service providers.

In a first round survey, we measured the underlying values of services for customers and the cost of providing services for desludging operators. We used this information to design two pricing treatment structures, one with fixed prices set based on household characteristics, and another with desludger bidding and negotiations with desludgers for lower prices. The fixed prices are set based on household characteristics; this treatment is designed to allow governments to target subsidies to poor households while financing some of the subsidies through price discrimination toward wealthier households. We will test whether these pricing structures, developed based on the underlying factors in the economy, perform better than the control group which has no pricing intervention in terms of total take-up of mechanized desludging. This project will describe and test how information on market structure can be used to help in designing interventions by governments to improve the market structure of sanitation services.

Intervention

In a first round survey, we measured the underlying values of desludging services for customers and the cost of providing services for desludging operators. We used this information to design two pricing treatment structures, one with fixed prices set based on household characteristics, and another with desludger bidding and negotiations with desludgers for lower prices. The fixed prices are set based on household characteristics; this treatment is designed to allow governments to target subsidies to poor households while financing some of the subsidies through price discrimination toward wealthier households. We will test whether these pricing structures, developed based on the underlying factors in the economy, perform better than the control group which has no pricing intervention in terms of total take-up of mechanized desludging. This project will describe and test how information on market structure can be used to help in designing interventions by governments to improve the market structure of sanitation services.

Experimental design

In many peri-urban communities in developing countries (like Ouagadougou), the market for sanitation services (especially mechanical desludging) is under-developed, and households often resort to using inferior (manual desludging) methods.

In Burkina Faso, we use measures of the underlying values for improved desludging services from a survey run in December, 2014, and second-price auctions for the procurement of desludging services run from December 2014 through July 2015 to develop a model of the optimal tariffs to charge each household for desludging services in order to increase take-up as much as possible given a constrained budget for subsidies.

We test the modeled “ideal” prices against two options: first, a pure control group of households which are offered no pricing intervention, and second, a group of households that are asked to call into the call center for a desludging when they need one, and are given the lowest cost desludger that the call center is able to find through a bid-undercutting mechanism.

The endline survey will be rolled out after the randomized price structures have been in effect for at least 12 months. At this point, we expect the median household to have used 2 desludgings since the roll out of the price structures, and we will be able to observe the relative impact of the different price structures, estimate demand for sanitation services, and estimate the impact of the monitoring interventions.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization unit
Neighborhood clusters of 30-40 households
Clusters
126
Observations
3,750
Arms
1,550 in the price structure intervention, 1000 in the bid-undercutting treatment, and 1,200 control
Primary outcomes
takeup of mechanical desludging, takeup of mechanical desludging among heterogeneous consumer groups, mechanical desludging prices offered by suppliers

Cited by

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Keywords