“Uncertain Competition in the Ultimatum Game”

How to cite

Magnuson, Connor; Thunstrom, Linda; Cherry, Todd; Ritten, Chian Jones. 2021. "“Uncertain Competition in the Ultimatum Game”." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008323. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8323-1.0

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Connor Magnuson* , Linda Thunstrom , Todd Cherry , Chian Jones Ritten

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008323
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8323-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-09-13 – 2021-10-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8323

Abstract

This study seeks to identify how uncertainty about competition shape labor market outcomes. This paper will use a variant of the ultimatum game that corresponds to posted-offer hiring to identify how uncertain competition alter labor market outcomes. Our ultimatum game will incorporate competition through multiple respondents for a single proposer and will incorporate uncertainty by hiding the true number of respondents from other respondents.

Intervention

We vary the structure of the ultamatum game to capture the effects of uncertainty and competition on outcomes.

Experimental design

We will run treatment groups through Qualtrics. The first batch of subjects will be assigned the role of proposer and will be randomly assigned to one of three treatments: standard ultimatum game, competitive ultimatum game, and uncertain
competitive ultimatum game. Once proposers have been assigned to their treatment, they will then decide how to split $10. After making their offer, they will complete a demographic survey and then exit the survey.

The second batch of experiments will be assigned the role of respondent and will be randomly assigned to a treatment group. Respondents are then matched to an offer that was made by a proposer. They then decide to accept or reject the offer. After making this descision, they complete a demographic survey and exit the survey.

We will use a 3x1 design: standard ultimatum game, competitive ultimatum game, and uncertain
competitive ultimatum game. The standard ultimatum game and the competitive ultimatum game will
allow us to replicate Fischbacher et al. 2009. We observe the proposer’s offer and the responder’s
decision to accept or reject the offer. After the experiment is over, we can create a probability of
acceptance for each potential split.

Subjects within the standard ultimatum treatment will be told that they will play the ultimatum game with
one other partner. Subjects within the competitive ultimatum treatment will be told that there will be one
proposer and three respondents in each group. If more than one respondent accepts an offer in a round,
one randomly determined respondent will receive the entire payment. In the uncertain competitive
ultimatum treatment, subjects will be told that there will be a 50% chance that there will only be one
respondent and a 50% chance that there will be three respondents in the group.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization unit
Individual randomization
Clusters
600 total subjects (200 offers and 400 responses)
Observations
600 total subjects (200 offers and 400 responses)
Arms
50 proposers control, 50 proposer competition, 50 proposers uncertain control, 50 proposers uncertain competition 50 respondents control, 150 respondents competition, 50 respondents uncertain control, 150 respondents uncertain competition
Primary outcomes
Ultimatum Game Split, Offer acceptance

Cited by

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Keywords