An experiment on how wage discretion affects distribution preferences

How to cite

Knutsen, Tora; Kovacevic, Sonja. 2021. "An experiment on how wage discretion affects distribution preferences." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008291. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8291-3.0

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Tora Knutsen* , Sonja Kovacevic

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008291
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8291-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-10-12 – 2021-10-26
Countries
Norway ()
JEL codes
C91; D63; H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8291

Abstract

We will run an experimental study on redistribution preferences in the presence of wage discretion. In the experiment participants decide how to split a bonus between two workers who did the same task. First, participants are presented a preliminary split of the bonus made prior to the study. For the treatment group, one of the workers within the pair has determined the earning split, while for the control group, a disinterested third party made the decision. By construction, the distribution of performances and preliminary earnings will be identical across the two groups. Thus, the difference between choices made by the control and treatment group can only be attributed to the difference in the process of deciding the preliminary split of the bonus. We want to test whether the workers' opportunity to suggest their own wage share changes spectators' distribution choices.

Intervention

We conduct our experiment on the online platform Prolific, recruiting participants to a study called ``Decide about final wages to participants in another Prolific study". Participants in this study decide in fact about wages for a previous study, conducted on the same platform which is registered as part of this trial. We randomize participants into the treatment and control group according to the order in which they enter the experiment, where even incoming participants are assigned to be in the control group and odd incoming participants are assigned to be in the treatment group. Participants are asked to decide how to split a bonus of 2 pounds between two pairs of workers who did the same task. We implement these choices for one of the two worker pairs with 50%.

Experimental design

We conduct our experiment on the online platform Prolific, recruiting participants to a study called ``Decide about final wages to participants in another Prolific study". Participants in this study decide in fact about wages for a previous study, conducted on the same platform. We randomize participants into the treatment and control group according to the order in which they enter the experiment, where even incoming participants are assigned to be in the control group and odd incoming participants are assigned to be in the treatment group. Participants are asked to decide how to split a bonus of 2 pounds between two pairs of workers who did the same task. We implement these choices for one of the two worker pairs with 50%.

Treatment spectators are shown worker pairs where a worker within the pair has decided their own share of the bonus, while control spectators are shown similar worker pairs where a third party made this decision. Thus, spectators in the control group and spectators in the treatment group look at worker pairs with similar performance levels, where either a randomly drawn worker from the pair (treatment group) or a third party worker drawn from the matched treatment group pair (control group) suggests preliminary wages.

Design details

Randomization method
By order in which participants enter the experiment. Even incoming participants are assigned to be in the control group and odd incoming participants are assigned to be in the treatment group.
Randomization unit
Participant in Prolific
Clusters
No clusters
Observations
2058 These are the number of participants that we will recruit for our spectator surveys. Part of the intervention is the worker experiment, where the initial earnings choices will be made that the spectators later decide on. In the worker experiment, there will be 2058 deciders in 2058 worker pairs (4114 in total), the same amount as spectators, since we will have one spectator per worker pair.
Arms
1029 in the treatment group and 1029 in the control group.
Primary outcomes
The choice of final earnings.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords