Enforcement and Deterrence with Certain Detection: An Experiment in Water Conservation Policy
How to cite
Gazze, Ludovica; Greenstone, Michael; Browne, Oliver; Rostapshova, Olga. 2021. "Enforcement and Deterrence with Certain Detection: An Experiment in Water Conservation Policy." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008290. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8290-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The emergence of new technologies that allow perfect detection of violations at near zero marginal cost can revolutionize the enforcement of environmental regulations. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement though smart water meters with Fresno, CA. Nearly 100,000 single-family households in Fresno were experimentally assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or visual inspection) and fine levels. We measure the impact of treatment assignment on outcomes related to enforcement and compliance, water use and customer contact with the water utility.
Intervention
The purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of a new, automated outdoor watering enforcement system in reducing overall water use while minimizing the number of fines issued. The intervention is targeted to the universe of single-family households in Fresno, California with smart water meters.
Experimental design
Between July 1, 2018 and September 30,2018, all single-family residential households with smart water meters in the city of Fresno, California were randomly assigned to groups that vary along two dimensions: Enforcement Method and Fine Level.
Along the Enforcement Method axis, households were assigned to one of two groups: Visual Inspection (household receives a fine if a violation is detected by visual inspection–this was the system in place until 2017, or the control), or Automated Enforcement (household receives a fine if a pre-installed water meter measures hourly water usage above a given threshold–this is the treatment or “intervention”). The Automated Enforcement group is further randomized into three groups defining the amount of water utilization that triggers an enforcement action:
i. Baseline (300 gallons/hour threshold)
ii. Reduced Enforcement 1 (500 gallons/hour threshold)
iii. Reduced Enforcement 2 (700 gallons/hour threshold)
The Reduced Enforcement thresholds were chosen, respectively, to reduce the expected number of automated fines issued by 50% and 75% relative to the baseline threshold of 300 gal/hr.
Along the Fine Level axis, households were randomized to receive different fine amounts. Violators received a maximum of one fine per month. The municipal code outlines the following fine schedule:
i. First month in violation: $0
ii. Second Month in violation: $50
iii. Third Month in violation: $100
iv. Fourth month in violation: $200
All households were randomly assigned to be subject to one of three fine levels:
i. Baseline ($0, $50, $100, $200)
ii. 50% Fine Discount ($0, $25, $50, $100)
iii. 75% Fine Discount ($0, $12.50, $25, $50)
In total, all households were randomly assigned to one of 11 treatment groups or a control group.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Browne, Oliver R., Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone, and Olga Rostapshova. "Man vs. machine: Technological promise and political limits of automated regulation enforcement." The Review of Economics and Statistics (2023): 1-36. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01316
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