Enforcement and Deterrence with Certain Detection: An Experiment in Water Conservation Policy

How to cite

Gazze, Ludovica; Greenstone, Michael; Browne, Oliver; Rostapshova, Olga. 2021. "Enforcement and Deterrence with Certain Detection: An Experiment in Water Conservation Policy." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008290. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8290-2.0

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Ludovica Gazze* , Michael Greenstone , Oliver Browne , Olga Rostapshova

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008290
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8290-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-07-01 – 2021-09-23
Countries
United States of America (California)
JEL codes
Q25, K42
Secondary IDs
Pre-analysis plan registered on June 14, 2018 via OSF Registries doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/XYFU3
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8290

Abstract

The emergence of new technologies that allow perfect detection of violations at near zero marginal cost can revolutionize the enforcement of environmental regulations. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement though smart water meters with Fresno, CA. Nearly 100,000 single-family households in Fresno were experimentally assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or visual inspection) and fine levels. We measure the impact of treatment assignment on outcomes related to enforcement and compliance, water use and customer contact with the water utility.

Intervention

The purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of a new, automated outdoor watering enforcement system in reducing overall water use while minimizing the number of fines issued. The intervention is targeted to the universe of single-family households in Fresno, California with smart water meters.

Experimental design

Between July 1, 2018 and September 30,2018, all single-family residential households with smart water meters in the city of Fresno, California were randomly assigned to groups that vary along two dimensions: Enforcement Method and Fine Level.

Along the Enforcement Method axis, households were assigned to one of two groups: Visual Inspection (household receives a fine if a violation is detected by visual inspection–this was the system in place until 2017, or the control), or Automated Enforcement (household receives a fine if a pre-installed water meter measures hourly water usage above a given threshold–this is the treatment or “intervention”). The Automated Enforcement group is further randomized into three groups defining the amount of water utilization that triggers an enforcement action:
i. Baseline (300 gallons/hour threshold)
ii. Reduced Enforcement 1 (500 gallons/hour threshold)
iii. Reduced Enforcement 2 (700 gallons/hour threshold)
The Reduced Enforcement thresholds were chosen, respectively, to reduce the expected number of automated fines issued by 50% and 75% relative to the baseline threshold of 300 gal/hr.

Along the Fine Level axis, households were randomized to receive different fine amounts. Violators received a maximum of one fine per month. The municipal code outlines the following fine schedule:

i. First month in violation: $0
ii. Second Month in violation: $50
iii. Third Month in violation: $100
iv. Fourth month in violation: $200

All households were randomly assigned to be subject to one of three fine levels:
i. Baseline ($0, $50, $100, $200)
ii. 50% Fine Discount ($0, $25, $50, $100)
iii. 75% Fine Discount ($0, $12.50, $25, $50)
In total, all households were randomly assigned to one of 11 treatment groups or a control group.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization was completed in an office using a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization was completed at the household-level.
Clusters
89,581 households
Observations
89,581 households
Arms
- Control Group 1. Non-automated enforcement, Baseline fine group: 40,311 - Treatment Groups Non-automated enforcement: 2. 50% fine level: 4,479 3. 25% fine level: 4,479 Automated: 300 gal/hr water use threshold: 4. Baseline fine: 4,479 5. 50% fine level: 4,479 6. 25% fine level: 4,479 Automated: 500gal/hr water use threshold: 7. Baseline fine: 4,479 8. 50% fine level: 4,479 9. 25% fine level: 4,479 Automated: 500gal/hr water use threshold: 10. Baseline fine: 4,479 11. 50% fine level: 4,480 12. 25% fine level: 4,479
Primary outcomes
The primary outcomes of the experiment can be grouped into three categories: i. Hourly Water Use: This contains hourly water use mapped to a household ID for each household in the study. ii. Enforcement Actions: This contains enforcement actions taken by the city, i.e. warnings and fines that have been issued by the city for non-compliance with the written ordinance. This information contains date of enforcement action and enforcement action type, and is linked to the household ID. iii. Other City Actions: This contains information on other actions the City of Fresno has taken to foster water conservation, such as rebates that have been given to households for purchasing water-efficient appliances, free water timer tutorials that have been provided, and other initiatives including a customer support hotline.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Browne, Oliver R., Ludovica Gazze, Michael Greenstone, and Olga Rostapshova. "Man vs. machine: Technological promise and political limits of automated regulation enforcement." The Review of Economics and Statistics (2023): 1-36. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01316

Cited by

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Keywords