Behavioral insights and tax compliance: Experimental evidence from Belgium
How to cite
Neve, Jan-Emmanuel De; Spinnewijn, Johannes. 2015. "Behavioral insights and tax compliance: Experimental evidence from Belgium." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000827. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.827-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We aim to study the effect of nudges in reminder letters at two different stages of the tax cycle. In collaboration with the Ministry of Finance of Belgium, we are designing an RCT on Belgian taxpayers that are either late with their tax payment or that have not filed their tax return. For the trial on the late payment reminder we will circulate 8 treatment letters in addition to the current control letter. These treatment letters introduce the following nudges: (1) simplification; (2) social norm; (3) public goods (positively framed); (4) public goods (negatively framed); (5) social norm + public goods; (6) active choice; (7) explicit penalty; and (8) active choice + explicit penalty. For the trial on the late filing reminder the following 3 treatment letters will be circulated in addition to a simplified control letter: (1) social norm; (2) public goods; (3) social norm + public goods. The nudges that we introduce in these reminder letters are grounded in behavioral insights such as loss aversion (positive vs. negatively framed public goods letters), social preferences (social norm letter), and status quo bias (active choice letter). We aim to treat the universe of late tax filers and late taxpayers in Belgium. The last two digits of the national identity number will be used to randomly assign treatment letters across the population. All treatment and control groups have equal size (in terms of number of letters sent out). The outcome variables will include tax payments, timing of payment, and number of filers and we will analyse heterogeneous treatment effects across taxpayers with different characteristics including gender, income, age, job status (employee or self-employed), region, online or paper filing. We also aim to convince the tax administration to send out new letters in a second year in order (1) to further validate the heterogeneous treatment effects using the first-year results to determine the random allocation to treatment and (2) to evaluate the persistence of the treatment effects.
Experimental design
We aim to study the effect of nudges in reminder letters at two different stages of the tax cycle. In collaboration with the Ministry of Finance of Belgium, we are designing an RCT on Belgian taxpayers that are either late with their tax payment or that have not filed their tax return. For the trial on the late payment reminder we will circulate 8 different treatment letters in addition to the current control letter. These treatment letters introduce the following nudges: (1) simplification; (2) social norm; (3) public goods (positively framed); (4) public goods (negatively framed); (5) social norm + public goods; (6) active choice; (7) explicit penalty; and (8) active choice + explicit penalty. For the trial on the late filing reminder the following 3 treatment letters will be circulated in addition to a simplified control letter: (1) social norm; (2) public goods; (3) social norm + public goods.
Design details
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