Do charitable appeals in bargaining crowd out voluntary donations?

How to cite

Schwirplies, Claudia; Lange, Andreas. 2021. "Do charitable appeals in bargaining crowd out voluntary donations?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008248. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8248-1.0

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Claudia Schwirplies* , Andreas Lange

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008248
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8248-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-10-04 – 2021-10-16
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C90, D64, H41, L31
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8248

Abstract

We test whether charitable offers within bargaining situations crowd out voluntary donations to charity. Inspired by bundles of private
and public goods in the marketplace, we implement variants of ultimatum games that allow for voluntary donations after the initial offer has been accepted. We test whether the option of linking charitable donations to offers in the bargaining situation increase the final provision of the public good. A special focus of the analyses will lie on gender differences as men and women were found to respond differently to social information in previous research.

Intervention

We design the experiment as an ultimatum game where we allow for donations to charity (by proposer and responder) after the offer has been accepted (ex post giving).

Experimental design

This experiment takes up the question whether linking private and public goods within bundled offers actually increases the provision of public goods or just opens a channel that fully crowds out otherwise existing voluntary donations. We run the experiment with Amazon MTurk workers. We implement variants of the ultimatum game to explore bundling and voluntary donations. In our first treatment (control), we link the standard ultimatum game with an ex post option to donate parts of the payoff to charity (UGdon). The second treatment (intervention) introduces this ex post donation option in a “prosocial ultimatum game” (PSUGdon), where the proposer can suggest a split between himself, the responder and a charitable donation. Ex post donations in UGdon and PSUGdon can be viewed as direct evidence for utility derived from the public good or warm-glow motives. The use of bundled offers in PSUGdon, on the other hand, can be driven by
strategic motivations in order to generate acceptance by responders. We are primarily interested in how this bundling channel impacts the additional voluntary donation and thus the total provision level of the public good. We also explore gender differences, especially in donations conditional on being confronted with a donation in the bargaining situation.

Design details

Randomization method
We randomly match proposers and responders together using a module for urn draws provided by SoSci Survey (https://www.soscisurvey.de/), a tool for online surveys, which we use for implementing the decisions on Amazon MTurk.
Randomization unit
We randomize at the individual level
Clusters
200 individuals per role (proposer/responder) and treatment
Observations
800 individuals
Arms
400 individuals per treatment
Primary outcomes
total donations (as a share of the endowment) and the total donation rate
Secondary outcomes
bundling rate (proportion of proposers who use the bundling channel), bundled donations (as share of the endowment), donation rate (proportion of players who give ex post) for proposers and responders, gender differences for all outcome variables, gender differences in donating ex post conditional on the bundled donation d > 0 or d = 0

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Keywords