Do charitable appeals in bargaining crowd out voluntary donations?
How to cite
Schwirplies, Claudia; Lange, Andreas. 2021. "Do charitable appeals in bargaining crowd out voluntary donations?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008248. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8248-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We test whether charitable offers within bargaining situations crowd out voluntary donations to charity. Inspired by bundles of private
and public goods in the marketplace, we implement variants of ultimatum games that allow for voluntary donations after the initial offer has been accepted. We test whether the option of linking charitable donations to offers in the bargaining situation increase the final provision of the public good. A special focus of the analyses will lie on gender differences as men and women were found to respond differently to social information in previous research.
Intervention
We design the experiment as an ultimatum game where we allow for donations to charity (by proposer and responder) after the offer has been accepted (ex post giving).
Experimental design
This experiment takes up the question whether linking private and public goods within bundled offers actually increases the provision of public goods or just opens a channel that fully crowds out otherwise existing voluntary donations. We run the experiment with Amazon MTurk workers. We implement variants of the ultimatum game to explore bundling and voluntary donations. In our first treatment (control), we link the standard ultimatum game with an ex post option to donate parts of the payoff to charity (UGdon). The second treatment (intervention) introduces this ex post donation option in a “prosocial ultimatum game” (PSUGdon), where the proposer can suggest a split between himself, the responder and a charitable donation. Ex post donations in UGdon and PSUGdon can be viewed as direct evidence for utility derived from the public good or warm-glow motives. The use of bundled offers in PSUGdon, on the other hand, can be driven by
strategic motivations in order to generate acceptance by responders. We are primarily interested in how this bundling channel impacts the additional voluntary donation and thus the total provision level of the public good. We also explore gender differences, especially in donations conditional on being confronted with a donation in the bargaining situation.
Design details
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