Rule enforcement and trust of fresh food vendors

How to cite

Granda, Francisca; Sanchez, Gonzalo; Keefer, Philip. 2021. "Rule enforcement and trust of fresh food vendors." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008245. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8245-1.1

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Francisca Granda* , Gonzalo Sanchez , Philip Keefer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008245
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8245-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-09-20 – 2021-10-30
Countries
Ecuador (Latin America)
JEL codes
H4, 017, O43
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8245

Abstract

We analyze rule enforcement in a setting of approximately 1200 vendors in 22 traditional fresh food markets in Quito, Ecuador. Markets' operations depend on vendors' payments for collective goods such as water supply, electricity, cleaning, and security guard services. However, the payments go through a complex administrative process and depend on vendors' trust and their rule enforcement preferences. Vendors associations' representatives and municipal agents are in charge of enforcement. The project aims to measure whether providing information about the default rate and the payment process has effects on vendors' preferences on rule enforcement.

Experimental design

We planned to have three groups: a control group and two treatment groups. The difference between them is the type of information they receive.
Group 1. They do not receive information. They will respond directly about the four enforcement rules.
Group 2. They receive information about the average market’s default rate.
Grupo 3. They receive information about the payment process.

Design details

Randomization method
Systemic random sampling in each market
Randomization unit
Vendors
Clusters
1224 fresh food market vendors
Observations
1224 fresh food market vendors
Arms
408
Primary outcomes
We want to respond to three questions: 1. What is the effect of information on the average default rates on the four reform preferences? 2. What is the effect of information about the payment process on the four reform preferences? 3. How do these preferences change regarding trust among vendors and on vendors associations' representatives and municipal agents?
Secondary outcomes
x

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords