Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance

How to cite

Rafiq, Solin; Bopp, Fabian. 2021. "Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008226. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8226-1.0

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Solin Rafiq* , Fabian Bopp

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008226
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8226-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-09-15 – 2021-09-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8226

Abstract

In the experimental study, we are exploring how the existence of mediocre selfish allocation is affecting the behavior in the hidden information game. We are able to observe whether not informing oneself and remain ignorant can be explained by a preference for pooling between a fair and unfair allocation.

Intervention

The intervention consists of an additionally added mediocre option in the hidden information treatment of moral wiggle room game by Dana Weber Krupka (2007).

Experimental design

The experimental design is a variation of the dictator game firstly initiated by DWK. There will be a session in which participants have to choose between two payoff options in which the payoff information for the "Dictator" is visible while the payoff information for the "Receiver" is not determined. Participants can choose whether or not to "Reveal" the payoff information for the second player before making their final decision. Afterwards, in the second session participants will be offered two chances to change their decision and choose among four instead of two payoffs.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by computer.
Randomization unit
individual level
Clusters
1
Observations
120 Observations
Arms
120 subjects. By design, we use a within comparison only varying the order to control for order effects.
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variable is whether participants reveal information on the effect of their action on another person. The decision is binary.
Secondary outcomes
The secondary outcome is the allocation chosen given the subject's first decision.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords