Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance
How to cite
Rafiq, Solin; Bopp, Fabian. 2021. "Pooling to mediocre Fairness and Strategic Ignorance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008226. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8226-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In the experimental study, we are exploring how the existence of mediocre selfish allocation is affecting the behavior in the hidden information game. We are able to observe whether not informing oneself and remain ignorant can be explained by a preference for pooling between a fair and unfair allocation.
Intervention
The intervention consists of an additionally added mediocre option in the hidden information treatment of moral wiggle room game by Dana Weber Krupka (2007).
Experimental design
The experimental design is a variation of the dictator game firstly initiated by DWK. There will be a session in which participants have to choose between two payoff options in which the payoff information for the "Dictator" is visible while the payoff information for the "Receiver" is not determined. Participants can choose whether or not to "Reveal" the payoff information for the second player before making their final decision. Afterwards, in the second session participants will be offered two chances to change their decision and choose among four instead of two payoffs.
Design details
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