Innovative payments for environmental services to curb deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
How to cite
Subervie, Julie; Dias, Gabriela Demarchi. 2021. "Innovative payments for environmental services to curb deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008193. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8193-1.1
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Curbing deforestation in developing countries may be a cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions and address climate change. But how to prevent the deforestation and degradation of forest lands in areas where landowners depend, for their livelihood, on slash-and-burn agriculture and extensive cattle ranching, two primary drivers of deforestation? In Brazil, the implementation of command-and-control measures, the expansion of protected areas, and interventions in the soy and beef supply chains, such as the Soy Moratorium established in 2006, have significantly curbed deforestation in the Amazon between 2005 and 2013. Despite this overall improvement, deforestation rates have continued at 5,000-7,000 km2 per year since 2009 and have increased again thereafter. Today, it is often argued that new mechanisms targeting small landowners are required to achieve further reductions in deforestation in the Amazon. Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) contract may be an option but we need more evidence about which PES contracts work on the ground. In particular, we need to know which programs are most effective, in which context, and whether they work equally for all targeted participants. The objective of this experiment is to test the impact of different contracts of payments for environmental services (PES) on the deforestation decision of the Brazilian Amazonian cattle breeders. The experiment is based on the implementation of a pilot conservation program, in which participants are randomly offered a PES in exchange for not cutting their forest for an entire year. We randomly offer two types of contracts, which differ in their specifications, one being more flexible than the other. We evaluate whether one contract outperform the other, looking at forest loss, as measured by satellite imagery using SAR Sentinel-1 images. In each arm of the RCT, PES contracts is offered to participants following a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. This design has many advantages: it is incentive compatible, since revealing the true price remains the best strategy for the participant; it allows to infer the causal effect of compensation payments on forest cover; and it allows estimating heterogeneous treatment effects.
Intervention
The objective of this experiment is to test the impact of different contracts of payments for environmental services (PES) on the deforestation decision of the Brazilian Amazonian cattle breeders. The experiment is based on the implementation of a pilot conservation program, in which participants will be randomly offered a PES in exchange for not cutting their forest for an entire year. The treatment is the PES.
Experimental design
We use a randomized control trial (RCT) to compare the relative efficiency of contracts A and B. In each arm of the RCT, PES contracts is offered to participants following a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure.
Each volunteer participant is asked to sign an FPIC form specifying that they understand that their participation in the pilot program does not guarantee that they will receive a conditional payment at the end, as the pilot includes two phases of randomization.
In the first phase of randomization (lottery #1), the volunteers are randomly assigned to the arms of the trial, which include one control group and two treatment groups. People in the treatment groups are offered to participate in a second lottery, which will designate individuals who will receive a conditional payment. People in the control group are not offered such an opportunity and will be left with a gift worth 5 euros in compensation for the time given to the investigators.
In the second phase of randomization (lottery #2), people assigned to the treatment groups are asked to reveal the price they are willing to accept not to cut down their forest. They then participate in a (BDM) lottery which determines whether they are offered a conditional payment contract for the next twelve months.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Gabriela Demarchi, Julie Subervie, Cauê Carrilho, Thibault Catry, Antoine Pfefer, et al.. Greater Flexibility in Payments for Ecosystem Services: Evidence from an RCT in the Amazon. 2024. https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04462983
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.