Innovative payments for environmental services to curb deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon

How to cite

Subervie, Julie; Dias, Gabriela Demarchi. 2021. "Innovative payments for environmental services to curb deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008193. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8193-1.1

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Julie Subervie* , Gabriela Demarchi Dias

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008193
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8193-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-09-12 – 2022-11-30
Countries
Brazil (Acre)
JEL codes
Q15 ; Q57 ; O13 ; N56
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8193

Abstract

Curbing deforestation in developing countries may be a cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions and address climate change. But how to prevent the deforestation and degradation of forest lands in areas where landowners depend, for their livelihood, on slash-and-burn agriculture and extensive cattle ranching, two primary drivers of deforestation? In Brazil, the implementation of command-and-control measures, the expansion of protected areas, and interventions in the soy and beef supply chains, such as the Soy Moratorium established in 2006, have significantly curbed deforestation in the Amazon between 2005 and 2013. Despite this overall improvement, deforestation rates have continued at 5,000-7,000 km2 per year since 2009 and have increased again thereafter. Today, it is often argued that new mechanisms targeting small landowners are required to achieve further reductions in deforestation in the Amazon. Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) contract may be an option but we need more evidence about which PES contracts work on the ground. In particular, we need to know which programs are most effective, in which context, and whether they work equally for all targeted participants. The objective of this experiment is to test the impact of different contracts of payments for environmental services (PES) on the deforestation decision of the Brazilian Amazonian cattle breeders. The experiment is based on the implementation of a pilot conservation program, in which participants are randomly offered a PES in exchange for not cutting their forest for an entire year. We randomly offer two types of contracts, which differ in their specifications, one being more flexible than the other. We evaluate whether one contract outperform the other, looking at forest loss, as measured by satellite imagery using SAR Sentinel-1 images. In each arm of the RCT, PES contracts is offered to participants following a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure. This design has many advantages: it is incentive compatible, since revealing the true price remains the best strategy for the participant; it allows to infer the causal effect of compensation payments on forest cover; and it allows estimating heterogeneous treatment effects.

Intervention

The objective of this experiment is to test the impact of different contracts of payments for environmental services (PES) on the deforestation decision of the Brazilian Amazonian cattle breeders. The experiment is based on the implementation of a pilot conservation program, in which participants will be randomly offered a PES in exchange for not cutting their forest for an entire year. The treatment is the PES.

Experimental design

We use a randomized control trial (RCT) to compare the relative efficiency of contracts A and B. In each arm of the RCT, PES contracts is offered to participants following a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure.
Each volunteer participant is asked to sign an FPIC form specifying that they understand that their participation in the pilot program does not guarantee that they will receive a conditional payment at the end, as the pilot includes two phases of randomization.
In the first phase of randomization (lottery #1), the volunteers are randomly assigned to the arms of the trial, which include one control group and two treatment groups. People in the treatment groups are offered to participate in a second lottery, which will designate individuals who will receive a conditional payment. People in the control group are not offered such an opportunity and will be left with a gift worth 5 euros in compensation for the time given to the investigators.
In the second phase of randomization (lottery #2), people assigned to the treatment groups are asked to reveal the price they are willing to accept not to cut down their forest. They then participate in a (BDM) lottery which determines whether they are offered a conditional payment contract for the next twelve months.

Design details

Randomization method
Random assignment to the arms of the trial (lottery #1) is performed using computer software. Lottery #2 consists of drawing a ball at random in a ballot box following a BDM procedure.
Randomization unit
Individual farmer randomization
Clusters
No clusters.
Observations
Sample size is 600 farms.
Arms
Sample size by treatment arm is 200.
Primary outcomes
The main indicator of deforestation is the loss of forest cover as measured by satellite imagery. Deforestation monitoring is carried out using SAR Sentinel-1 images, processed by the so-called CuSum algorithm developed by Ygorra et al. (2021).
Secondary outcomes
Other outcomes include (i) the abandonment of the contract (by simple termination) and (ii) cost-effectiveness measured as the ratio of the area cut and the payment paid.

Papers from this trial

  1. Gabriela Demarchi, Julie Subervie, Cauê Carrilho, Thibault Catry, Antoine Pfefer, et al.. Greater Flexibility in Payments for Ecosystem Services: Evidence from an RCT in the Amazon. 2024. https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04462983

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Keywords