Measuring the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information in Consumer Credit Markets
How to cite
DeFusco, Anthony; Tang, Huan; Yannelis, Constantine. 2021. "Measuring the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information in Consumer Credit Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008183. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8183-1.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Information asymmetries are known in theory to lead to inefficiently low credit provision, yet empirical estimates of the resulting welfare losses are scarce. This paper leverages a randomized experiment conducted by a large fintech lender to estimate welfare losses arising from asymmetric information in the market for online consumer credit. Building on methods from the insurance literature, we show how exogenous variation in interest rates can be used to estimate borrower demand and lender cost curves and recover implied welfare losses. While asymmetric information generates large equilibrium price distortions, we find only small overall welfare losses, particularly for high-credit-score borrowers.
Intervention
The experiment we analyze was designed independently by our data provider to examine loan applicants’ sensitivity to borrowing costs and was implemented from January to March, 2018. The platform randomly selected 11,180 potential borrowers into the experiment who had successfully applied and qualified for credit during this window. Selected applicants were then randomly divided into two equal-sized groups: one control group and one treatment group. Applicants in the control group were offered standard financing terms, while the treatment group received a 40 percent reduction in their overall cost of borrowing. Data was then collected for each of these loan applicants on whether they took up the loan and their subsequent repayment behavior.
Experimental design
The platform randomly selected 11,180 potential borrowers into the experiment who had successfully applied and qualified for credit during this window. Selected applicants were then randomly divided into two equal-sized groups: one control group and one treatment group. Applicants in the control group were offered standard financing terms, while the treatment group received a 40 percent reduction in their overall cost of borrowing. Data was then collected for each of these loan applicants on whether they took up the loan and their subsequent repayment behavior.
Design details
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