Experimental evidence on socially responsible investments – The role of preferences and information
How to cite
Braun, Fabian; Gill, Andrej; Hett, Florian. 2021. "Experimental evidence on socially responsible investments – The role of preferences and information." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008178. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8178-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the role of preferences, incentives and information for socially responsible investments (SRI) in an online experiment. We analyze which investors buy sustainable stocks, to what extent they are willing to pay for information about the sustainability of stocks and how investors react to information about the performance of sustainable stocks. Finally, we analyze the effect of endogenous information acquisition in the ESG context in combination with different incentives to invest in a portfolio with a low ESG risk rating. To address these questions, we implement an incentive compatible stock market game with approximately 660 students. All participants are introduced to different information and incentive treatments. Furthermore, we experimentally elicit risk preferences, altruism, and warm glow giving and combine these measures with survey evidence.
Intervention
We implement an incentivized online stock market game and study individual investment decisions in different treatments. After collecting baseline demand for sustainable investments, we exogenously vary information on the performance of firms with a low ESG risk profile between different groups and observe subjects reaction to that new information in our incentivized stock market game. Furthermore, we vary incentives to invest in low ESG risk stocks and observe participants selective information acquisition and their subsequent investment behavior.
Experimental design
We implement an online experiment where individuals participate in an online stock market game. We first collect baseline information about the demand for ESG in the stock market game. In the next step, our intervention randomly assigns information about the performance of stocks with a low ESG risk score to the participants. 50% of the sample receives information of real studies which tell them that low ESG risk stocks outperform, while the remaining 50% receive information of real studies which tell that low ESG risk stocks underperform. We observe individuals reaction in the stock market game. In a later stage of the experiment, we randomly assign different incentives to invest in a portfolio with a low ESG risk to the participants. Part of the participants can endogenously acquire information about ESG and moral behavior while others cannot. We again observe participants behavior in the stock market game.
Design details
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