Experiments on Willful Ignorance

How to cite

Bopp, Fabian; Schnedler, Wendelin. 2021. "Experiments on Willful Ignorance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008172. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8172-1.1

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Fabian Bopp* , Wendelin Schnedler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008172
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8172-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-03-01 – 2022-05-31
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
D83, C72, C91
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8172

Abstract

Many people claim to intend to act pro-socially but do not. One reason might be that they are willfully ignoring the harm that they impose on others; this may allow them to maintain a positive self-image while serving their own interests. If this is the case, careful reflection may reveal to subjects that they are "kidding" themselves. We examine experimentally, whether reflection results in more people informing themselves about the negative consequences of their choices.

Intervention

The intervention will consist of an ex-ante questionnaire, which is administered to half of the participants. In the questionnaire, the subjects will be confronted with questions with the aim to cause a better reflection of the situation.

Experimental design

The design is based on the hidden information treatment in the moral wiggle room game by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007). Subject A can choose between two Options 'high' and 'low'. His payoff is directly connected to his choice and is known to subject A. Also, the payoff of subject B is depending on the choice of A. Here, at the beginning of the game either the interest are conflicting or aligned. If the interests are aligned the 'high' option is best for both subjects. If the interests are conflicting, the 'low' option is better for subject B and worse for A. In this case, subject A would be in a social dilemma. Subject A can decide whether he wants to learn whether the interests are aligned or conflicting. (This is the primary outcome variable.) In order to maximize observations, we use the stratetgy method for the information decision. To boost reflection, we use a questionnaire that half of the subjects in the role of A have to fill in. (This is the intervention.) In the questionnaire, A has to answer questions on his future actions in the game and thus ex-ante think through and reflect the game.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done on individual level by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Depending on the show-up rate and technical procedure the number of experimental sessions may vary. We plan to conduct X-Y sessions with 24 subjects per session.
Observations
XXX subjects
Arms
As one treatment arm will be a replication the size of this arm can vary on the results. If in our pool the results are on a very similar level and are not significantly different from other studies, we may pool our data with old data and focus on the non-replication treatments. If this is not the case we will have same-sized treatment arms.
Primary outcomes
The variable of interest is whether subjects reveal information or not.
Secondary outcomes
The follow-up decision in the game after revealing or not revealing information is to either make a selfish or a prosocial choice.

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Keywords