Does Political Corruption Cumulate in Its Effects?

How to cite

Jha, Saumitra; Rivera, Eduardo; Bejarano, Enrique Seira. 2021. "Does Political Corruption Cumulate in Its Effects?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008170. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8170-1.1

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Saumitra Jha* , Eduardo Rivera , Enrique Seira Bejarano

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008170
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8170-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-09-13 – 2021-12-20
Countries
Mexico (Oaxaca)
JEL codes
C93, C72, O10, D02, D91, N00, J15
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8170

Abstract

The last decade has witnessed a large increase in the perception of corruption in Latin America, and at the same time a decrease in preferences for democracy and trust. In a previous RCT, "Rebuilding Trust, Social Cohesion and Democratic Values", (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7770-1.0.) we randomly assigned videos documenting politicians from different parties taking bribes in Mexico, among other treatments, to see whether the relationship between corruption and lack of trust in democracy is causal and how democratic values can be restored.

One open question, however, is whether political corruption cumulates in its effects. In other words, whether, exposure to additional evidence of corruption has an effect relative to just one. In this RCT, we exploit new video evidence that came to light during our previous RCT to examine this question.

Intervention

We will conduct an individually randomized control trial in Oaxaca City, Mexico. The experiment involves visiting close to 1750 voting age Mexicans in Oaxaca who already consented to participate in our previous study (https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7770-1.0.) After asking baseline questions, we will randomly assign half of the urban sample to view a video of news footage of a second brother of the President taking a bribe. As detailed in the previous study, the urban sample includes 200 who had already seen a previous video of the first brother, as well as 200 who had received a video of opposition politicians, as well as 400 who had received a `nation-building' video, along with a financial exposure intervention. 150 had received a video about Mexico's economic performance, and 400 had received only a stock intervention. 400 were control. We cross-randomize the new treatment, assigning half in all these cells.

The aim of this new treatment is to examine the effects of information about corruption in a post-election setting, and also to examine whether effects of corruption cumulate with randomly assigned additional evidence. A cumulating effect is consistent with gradual Bayesian updating with strong initial priors. However, there are two reasons why there might be no cumulating effect. The first is that individuals may have already converged in their beliefs after the first dose of information, while the second is that they are unswayed by such information. we can test all of these, comparing individuals responses to the two waves of videos. It may also be a dormant effect: even if individuals do not immediately recall the first treatment, it may be the case that the `second brother’ video will have greater effects for those who had already been treated relative to those in the control who are exposed to this video.

We also anticipate differential treatment effects for ex ante stronger incumbent supporters. For those exposed to the incumbent treatment, these effects may be strengthened (due to greater updating) or weakened (due to motivated reasoning). However, since only 100 in the sample will have received both incumbent corruption videos, this intervention is underpowered, and therefore we consider it exploratory.

Experimental design

We will randomly assign 1/2 of a sample of 1750 individuals news footage of corruption.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in an office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Randomization at the individual level.
Clusters
1750 individually randomized adults.
Observations
1750 subjects: adults with a valid voting ID
Arms
We will have 875 per treatment arm (though fewer in specific sub-treatment cells, see below).
Primary outcomes
We will ask the following survey questions after the video. 1. Preference for democracy using questions adapted from Latinobarometer, including: “In general, would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, a little satisfied or not satisfied with the democracy in Mexico?”, “On a scale from 1-10 we ask you to evaluate how democratic is Mexico”, etc. 2. Perceptions about the prevalence of corruption, including: “How much progress do you think has been made in reducing corruption within State institutions in these past 2 years?”, “Which party do you think is the most corrupt”, etc. 3. Survey measures of voting, including: “If presidential elections were to be held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” We will ask them for which party they voted in the past election, before the video, to evaluate the effect of the first videos on real voting. We will also ask a question about trust in specific institutions: “Please state, for each one of the groups, institutions or people mentioned in the following list, how much trust do you have in them”
Sponsors
Name: Conflict and Polarization Initiative, King Center on Global Development Location: Stanford University, USA Url: https://kingcenter.stanford.edu

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Keywords