Do financial incentives send non-financial signals?
How to cite
Akesson, Jesper. 2021. "Do financial incentives send non-financial signals?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008152. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8152-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In this online experiment, we study the extent to which financial incentives change behaviour by 1) altering the pecuniary costs and benefits associated with actions or by 2) conveying non-price information. We construct an economic game (n = 3,657) in which some participants (‘employers’) set the salary (‘incentive’) that other participants (‘employees’) earn when completing an effort task on behalf of a charity (‘client’). Employers must choose from one of two possible incentive schemes; however, some employers are then randomly chosen to have their choices reversed. The structure of the game allows us to estimate whether the employers’ choice of incentives affects the behaviour of employees, holding constant the financial incentives that employees face.
Intervention
Study participants are first randomly assigned the role of ‘employer’ or ‘employee’. Those assigned the role of employers must choose between two incentive schemes that the employee will face when completing a task on behalf of a client (a charity).
If the employer chooses the first option (the '5-minute option'), she receives a large personal financial payoff, and the employees are given ten minutes to complete tasks. However, the employees are only remunerated for tasks completed during the first five minutes. If the employer chooses the second option (the '10-minute option'), she receives a smaller personal financial payoff. However, the employee is then remunerated for up to ten minutes of work, as opposed to just five minutes. Thus, the employer must choose between increasing her own financial payoff or instead offering the employee a more ‘generous’ incentive scheme.
For those assigned the role of employees, we randomly allocate them to employers, and randomly reverse the decisions of 25 percent of employers. The clients always earn the same amount per task completed by the employees (irrespective of the choice of the employer), and the employees know what the employers’ options and choices are.
Experimental design
Study participants are first randomly assigned the role of ‘employer’ or ‘employee’. Those assigned the role of employers must choose between two incentive schemes that the employee will face when completing a task on behalf of a client (a charity).
If the employer chooses the first option (the '5-minute option'), she receives a large personal financial payoff, and the employees are given ten minutes to complete tasks. However, the employees are only remunerated for tasks completed during the first five minutes. If the employer chooses the second option (the '10-minute option'), she receives a smaller personal financial payoff. However, the employee is then remunerated for up to ten minutes of work, as opposed to just five minutes. Thus, the employer must choose between increasing her own financial payoff or instead offering the employee a more ‘generous’ incentive scheme.
For those assigned the role of employees, we randomly allocate them to employers, and randomly reverse the decisions of 25 percent of employers. The clients always earn the same amount per task completed by the employees (irrespective of the choice of the employer), and the employees know what the employers’ options and choices are.
Design details
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