Do financial incentives send non-financial signals?

How to cite

Akesson, Jesper. 2021. "Do financial incentives send non-financial signals?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008152. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8152-1.0

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Jesper Akesson*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008152
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8152-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2020-12-04 – 2020-12-16
Countries
Germany (), Spain (), Ireland ()
JEL codes
C7, C9, D9
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8152

Abstract

In this online experiment, we study the extent to which financial incentives change behaviour by 1) altering the pecuniary costs and benefits associated with actions or by 2) conveying non-price information. We construct an economic game (n = 3,657) in which some participants (‘employers’) set the salary (‘incentive’) that other participants (‘employees’) earn when completing an effort task on behalf of a charity (‘client’). Employers must choose from one of two possible incentive schemes; however, some employers are then randomly chosen to have their choices reversed. The structure of the game allows us to estimate whether the employers’ choice of incentives affects the behaviour of employees, holding constant the financial incentives that employees face.

Intervention

Study participants are first randomly assigned the role of ‘employer’ or ‘employee’. Those assigned the role of employers must choose between two incentive schemes that the employee will face when completing a task on behalf of a client (a charity).

If the employer chooses the first option (the '5-minute option'), she receives a large personal financial payoff, and the employees are given ten minutes to complete tasks. However, the employees are only remunerated for tasks completed during the first five minutes. If the employer chooses the second option (the '10-minute option'), she receives a smaller personal financial payoff. However, the employee is then remunerated for up to ten minutes of work, as opposed to just five minutes. Thus, the employer must choose between increasing her own financial payoff or instead offering the employee a more ‘generous’ incentive scheme.

For those assigned the role of employees, we randomly allocate them to employers, and randomly reverse the decisions of 25 percent of employers. The clients always earn the same amount per task completed by the employees (irrespective of the choice of the employer), and the employees know what the employers’ options and choices are.

Experimental design

Study participants are first randomly assigned the role of ‘employer’ or ‘employee’. Those assigned the role of employers must choose between two incentive schemes that the employee will face when completing a task on behalf of a client (a charity).

If the employer chooses the first option (the '5-minute option'), she receives a large personal financial payoff, and the employees are given ten minutes to complete tasks. However, the employees are only remunerated for tasks completed during the first five minutes. If the employer chooses the second option (the '10-minute option'), she receives a smaller personal financial payoff. However, the employee is then remunerated for up to ten minutes of work, as opposed to just five minutes. Thus, the employer must choose between increasing her own financial payoff or instead offering the employee a more ‘generous’ incentive scheme.

For those assigned the role of employees, we randomly allocate them to employers, and randomly reverse the decisions of 25 percent of employers. The clients always earn the same amount per task completed by the employees (irrespective of the choice of the employer), and the employees know what the employers’ options and choices are.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done using Qualtrics built-in program.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
n/a
Observations
3657 individuals
Arms
1615 'employers' and 2042 'employees' (of which 551 are assigned to employers who choose the 5-minute option and have their decisions reversed, 479 assigned to employers who choose the 5-minute option and do not have their decisions reversed, 512 assigned to employers who choose the 10-minute option and have their decisions reversed, and 500 assigned to employers who choose the 10-minute option and do not have their decisions reversed).
Primary outcomes
Our main outcome of interest is the effort that employees exert. As we cannot directly measure employee effort, we use the following proxy variables: 1) the number of strings that employees classify correctly, 2) the amount of time that employees spend working on the task, 3) whether employees spend more than five minutes working on the task, and 4) the number of strings that the employees think they classified correctly.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcomes of interest are employee perceptions regarding whether the welfare of the client is their responsibility and the selfishness of their employer. More specifically, we ask whether they agree with the following statements: “The employer made a selfish decision” and “It is my responsibility to ensure that the client receives an adequate payoff”.

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Keywords