Achieving Universal Health Coverage with an Unenforceable Mandate: Evidence from the Government of Indonesia's JKN Mandiri Program
How to cite
Olken, Benjamin; Ornaghi, Arianna; Hanna, Rema; Sumarto, Sudarno; Filkenstein, Amy; Banerjee, Abhijit. 2015. "Achieving Universal Health Coverage with an Unenforceable Mandate: Evidence from the Government of Indonesia's JKN Mandiri Program." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000815. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.815-3.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Law 40/2004 on the National Social Security System and Law 24/2011 on Social Security Carriers (BPJS) outlined Indonesia’s path towards the creation of a universal social security system. A primary goal is to achieve universal health coverage through a mandatory public health insurance scheme – Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN). Begun in January 2014, JKN aims to achieve total coverage by 2019.
JKN coverage is determined by household’s income and employment status. The Government of Indonesia (GoI) covers the insurance premia of the poor and near-poor, while wage workers premia are covered jointly by the employee and the employer. The toughest challenge will be the registration and retention of non-poor non-wage workers, who have to register for the program and make monthly payments.
Ensuring non-wage worker participation is especially difficult: not only is it harder for the government to locate these individuals and encourage them to sign up, but the fact that they have to bear the cost of their premia, and remit it directly to the government each monthly, decreases the probability that they would sign up.
The main objective of this project is to rigorously test potential strategies to increase the participation of non-poor informal workers into the insurance scheme. We focus on incentives to enroll at the household level and explore three main factors that could potentially be hindering participation: monetary costs, hassle costs and lack of information. Moreover, we test for adverse selection by looking at whether different incentives attract different types of people.
Experimental design
The trial consists of four different treatment arms, that will be all cross-cut with each other. Firstly, we will randomly assign households to different subsidy levels. Some households will receive a 50% subsidy in the form of a buy-one-get-one free bonus (if the family enrolls, they only have to pay the premium for half of the family members), some households will receive a full subsidy and some households will receive a no inpatient bonus (the household has to cover the full premium for all family members but, if they have no inpatient claim for a year, receive 50% of the premiums they paid back). The remaining households will receive no subsidy. Secondly, we will offer to half of the households the possibility to register on the spot as opposed to following the procedure that requires them to go to a central office. Thirdly, we will test three different information treatments focusing on health care costs of certain illnesses, a waiting period, and potential penalties for non-enrollment. Lastly, we will also vary the length of time for which the subsidy offer is valid (Medan only).
Design details
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