De Jure vs De Facto Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Indonesia

How to cite

Olken, Benjamin; Basri, M. Chatib; Hanna, Rema; Walsh, Claire. 2021. "De Jure vs De Facto Tax Enforcement: Evidence from Indonesia." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008056. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8056-1.0

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Benjamin Olken* , M. Chatib Basri , Rema Hanna , Claire Walsh

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008056
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8056-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-04-01 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Indonesia ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8056

Abstract

In many contexts, the taxes firms and individuals pay in practice are different from the taxes they are required to pay by law. While there is extensive research on taxpayer evasion and avoidance, there is little research on the role that tax officers’ behavior and beliefs play in de facto tax enforcement. What roles do tax officers’ revenue targets and beliefs about equity and/or fairness in taxation play in their enforcement strategies, and how do taxpayer characteristics, the costs of enforcement, and/or their bosses’ views mediate them? How does differential enforcement affect horizontal and/or vertical equity, or the effective marginal tax rates taxpayers across the income distribution pay? This survey experiment investigates the effects of priming tax officers to think about equity and fairness in taxation, and/or the effect of being assigned higher tax revenue targets, on their enforcement strategies. The study estimates treatment effects in hypothetical scenarios, and investigates how this changes when tax officers are primed to think about redistribution, and when they are under pressure to raise more money. We subsequently plan to investigate tax officers’ enforcement behavior in the real world by matching survey responses to anonymized tax administrative data on tax officer monitoring and compliance activities and taxpayer filing and payments. This study is being conducted in partnership with the Indonesian government who implemented the survey as part of their regular operations.

Experimental design

Out of a sample of 3,064 tax officers from 267 tax offices, 1,019 were randomly assigned to the beliefs treatment group, 1,533 to the higher revenue target, 509 to both treatments, and 1,021 to the comparison group.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in survey by a computer (Qualtrics)
Randomization unit
Tax officer
Clusters
23,270 taxpayer rankings, 3,064 tax officers
Observations
23,270 taxpayer rankings, 3,064 tax officers
Arms
1,019 tax officers were randomly assigned to the beliefs treatment group. 1,533 tax officers were assigned to the higher revenue target, and 1,531 to the low revenue target. 509 were assigned to both treatments, and 1,021 were assigned to the pure comparison group.
Primary outcomes
Taxpayer rank in survey experiment
Sponsors
Name: NSF Location: USA Url: https://www.nsf.gov/ Name: J-PAL SEA Indonesia Research Fund, Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Location: Indonesia Url: https://www.povertyactionlab.org/southeast-asia
Partners
Name: Government of Indonesia Partner_type: government Url: http://pajak.go.id/

Cited by

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Keywords