The Selection and the Making of Civil Servants: Evidence from China’s College Graduate Civil Services Program

How to cite

Yang, David Y.; Wang, Shaoda. 2021. "The Selection and the Making of Civil Servants: Evidence from China’s College Graduate Civil Services Program." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0008003. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8003-1.0

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David Y. Yang* , Shaoda Wang

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0008003
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8003-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-03-01 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/8003

Abstract

The quality, incentives, and ideologies of local civil servants in China greatly affect policy implementation and governance efficacy. This project aims to understand what shape the background, preferences, attitudes, and behaviors of civil servants in rural China. We propose to randomly change selection algorithm in half of the job postings of the China’s College Graduate Civil Services Program in Guangdong. We combine the field experiment with surveys and official social security records, and we will separately identify the selection margins (who apply to become local civil servants and which applicants the government selects) and the treatment margin (to what extent civil service experience changes the recruited candidates over time). We provide the first empirical evidence on the treatment effect of civil service experience, and we argue that it is important to incorporate the treatment margin in order to design the optimal selection mechanism.

Intervention

A random half of the job posts will implement the selection algorithm at the status quo, which places heavy weight on candidates’ political obedience. The other random half of the job posts will implement a new algorithm, which maintains the same factors of considerations but places heavier weight on competence.

Experimental design

We partner with the Guangdong local government to randomly alter the selection algorithm during the 2020 recruitment cycle. A random half of the job posts will implement the selection algorithm at the status quo, which places heavy weight on candidates’ political obedience. The other random half of the job posts will implement a new algorithm, which maintains the same factors of considerations but places heavier weight on competence.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Job posting.
Clusters
0
Observations
According to our simulation based on the application data from the 2017-18 recruitment cycle, the new algorithm would change selection outcomes among 1/3 of the positions. Hence, we will have 600 recruited applicants, and 600 applicants who would have been recruited under the algorithms not implemented in the corresponding posts.
Arms
600 applicants in the treatment group, and 600 applicants in the control group.
Primary outcomes
We use both surveys and social security records to examine characteristics of interest along the selection margins, as well as the outcomes of interests in the treatment margin.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords