Fighting Corruption in Peru: Detecting bias in prioritizing whistleblower complaints

How to cite

Best, Michael; Hjort, Jonas; Pierri, Gastón. 2021. "Fighting Corruption in Peru: Detecting bias in prioritizing whistleblower complaints." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007997. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7997-2.0

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Michael Best* , Jonas Hjort , Gastón Pierri

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007997
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7997-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-07-19 – 2021-08-31
Countries
Peru ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7997

Abstract

As part of its battle against corruption, the Peruvian government's Contraloría General de la República (CGR)---the Comptroller General---invites and receives a large number of anonymous complaints from citizens about misconduct by government officials. However, CGR receives a very large volume of whistleblower complaints, and has a small team that is tasked with receiving the complaints. As a result, CGR is forced to make triaging decisions about which complaints to prioritize and which to discard. These triage decisions are made by analysts who, as in any case where human judgement is involved, will suffer from inefficiency and potential bias. In the Peruvian context, the main candidate for potential bias is bias against indigenous people. This study seeks to measure this bias and discern its causes by differentiating between competing theories of discrimination.

This study is a lab-in-the-field experiment. We will hold sessions in which participants take part in a range of tasks under laboratory conditions, but without physically coming to a laboratory but rather taking part virtually from their home or office. The participants will perform two types of tasks. In the first part of the study, we aim to simulate under laboratory conditions, the triage decisions the analysts make. They will read examples of whistleblower complaints and then assign each complaint a priority score reflecting their impression of how likely it is that this case is worthy of deeper investigation. The complaints they read will be drawn from real, historical, examples of whistleblower complaints from the last 3 years. For a random subset of the complaints, the name of the accused individual will be switched from a Spanish-sounding name to an indigenous (Quechua or Aymara) sounding name, or vice versa. This technique will allow us to measure the extent of ethnic bias in triage decisions among respondents. Combining it with administrative data on the outcomes of the investigations of the cases that were, actually, investigated will allow us to study the sources of this bias. In the second part of the study we elicit a series of behavioral traits of the subjects that we can then correlate with the biases measured in the first part of the study. The subjects will be grouped into sessions with groups of 20 participants and asked to play a series of behavioral games designed to measure prosocial outcomes, such as their level of trust and cooperation. After finishing the tasks that require interaction between players, they will be presented with individual surveys regarding their personality and cognitive skills.

Intervention

The experimental sessions will generate data of two types. In the first part of the study, we aim to simulate under laboratory conditions, the triage decisions the analysts make. They will read examples of whistleblower complaints and then assign each complaint a priority score reflecting their impression of how likely it is that this case is worthy of deeper investigation. The complaints they read will be drawn from real, historical, examples of whistleblower complaints from the last 3 years. For a random subset of the complaints, the name of the accused individual will be switched from a Spanish-sounding name to an indigenous (Quechua or Aymara) sounding name, or vice versa. This technique will allow us to measure the extent of ethnic bias in triage decisions among respondents. Combining it with administrative data on the outcomes of the investigations of the cases that were, actually, investigated will allow us to study the sources of this bias.

In the second part of the study we elicit a series of behavioral traits of the subjects that we can then correlate with the biases measured in the first part of the study. The subjects will be grouped into sessions with groups of 20 participants and asked to play a series of behavioral games designed to measure prosocial outcomes, such as their level of trust and cooperation. After finishing the tasks that require interaction between players, they will be presented with individual surveys regarding their personality and cognitive skills.

Experimental design

The experimental sessions will generate data of two types. In the first part of the study, we aim to simulate under laboratory conditions, the triage decisions the analysts make. They will read examples of whistleblower complaints and then assign each complaint a priority score reflecting their impression of how likely it is that this case is worthy of deeper investigation. The complaints they read will be drawn from real, historical, examples of whistleblower complaints from the last 3 years. For a random subset of the complaints, the name of the accused individual will be switched from a Spanish-sounding name to an indigenous (Quechua or Aymara) sounding name, or vice versa. This technique will allow us to measure the extent of ethnic bias in triage decisions among respondents. Combining it with administrative data on the outcomes of the investigations of the cases that were, actually, investigated will allow us to study the sources of this bias.

In the second part of the study we elicit a series of behavioral traits of the subjects that we can then correlate with the biases measured in the first part of the study. The subjects will be grouped into sessions with groups of 20 participants and asked to play a series of behavioral games designed to measure prosocial outcomes, such as their level of trust and cooperation. After finishing the tasks that require interaction between players, they will be presented with individual surveys regarding their personality and cognitive skills.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer. We first randomize the order in which each analyst sees the cases in our library of cases, stratifying by case type. We stratify by how far the case made it through the complaints analysis process (1st stage rejection, second stage rejection, second stage alarm) x whether the case accused an official with an indigenous name. To do this, we form blocks of 31 randomly selected cases such that the proportion of cases in each stratum in each block matches the overall proportions and randomly order them. Then, within each block we randomly switch the name of the accused in 7.5 out of the 31 cases (we alternate between switching 7 and switching 8 names), stratifying by whether the original case had an indigenous or a hispanic name.
Randomization unit
Case
Clusters
We prepared 155 cases for each analyst and invited 203 analysts to participate. We expect that each analyst will be able to review an average of 90 cases in the time allowed, and that 190 analysts will attend the sessions for a total of 90 * 190 = 17,100 cases.
Observations
17,100
Arms
The randomization described above implies that the expected proportion of fake cases analysts see is 7.5 / 31 = 0.2419. So, if they do indeed see 90 cases and 190 analysts attend the sessions, we will have 0.2419 * 17,100 = 4137 fake cases and 12963 real cases.
Primary outcomes
triage decisions: 1) priority score given to cases; 2) probability analysts assign to case leading to triggering of alarm
Partners
Name: Contraloría General de la República Partner_type: government Url: https://www.contraloria.gob.pe/

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Keywords