Cash versus share auctions: An experimental study

How to cite

Peeters, Ronald; Bajoori, Elnaz; Wolk, Leonard. 2021. "Cash versus share auctions: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007950. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7950-1.1

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Ronald Peeters* , Elnaz Bajoori , Leonard Wolk

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007950
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7950-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-02-03 – 2022-02-02
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
JEL codes
C72, C91, C92, D44
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7950

Abstract

Almost all the existing literature on auctions – theoretical and experimental – focuses on the case when bidders make cash bids. In recent auction practice, however, bidders often can make share bids; that is, they bid a share of the future cash flow that is generated after winning the auction. In this experimental study, we investigate bidding behavior in the context of share auctions, both for first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions, and compare it to bidding behavior in cash auctions.

Experimental design

The experiment will be conducted online using oTree and participants will be recruited using Prolific.

Participants are, in pairs, bidding to take over a hypothetical company. The future profit (i.e., the value) of the company is uncertain, but bidders receive independently a signal regarding the probabilities associated with the possible profit levels. The distributions over the future profit levels are such that those for higher signals first-order stochastically dominate those for lower signals.

We have a 2x2 between-subjects design. One treatment dimension concerns the auction format being a first-price or a second-price sealed-bid auction. The other treatment dimension is whether bids are cash amounts or shares of the future profit.

Each treatment will be run following a strategy method: bidders specify their bid for each of the possible signals they can receive.
After having made their bidding decisions, there will be a short survey in which we ask few demographic questions and elicit their risk/loss attitude and risk literacy.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomizations are computerized.
Randomization unit
The randomizations are on individual level.
Clusters
1
Observations
200-240 participants (independent observations).
Arms
50-60 participants (independent observations) per treatment.
Primary outcomes
Improve our understanding of the functioning and performance of equity auctions.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords