Examining Poverty and Anti-Social Behavior in the Lab

How to cite

Abraham, Justin; Shapiro, Jeremy; Haushofer, Johannes. 2015. "Examining Poverty and Anti-Social Behavior in the Lab." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000791. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.791-1.0

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Justin Abraham* , Jeremy Shapiro , Johannes Haushofer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0000791
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.791-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-02-01 – 2015-07-01
Countries
Kenya (Nairobi)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/791

Abstract

This paper describes the analysis plan for a randomized experiment examining the effect of poverty on anti-sociality. This study aims to identify the extent to which poverty, through individual cognition and decision making, can influence behavior typically classified as anti-social (dishonesty, aggression, etc.). We simulate poverty in the lab by inducing a priming effect which makes salient psychological states associated with poverty. We observe anti-social behavior with a battery of tasks and questionnaires selected to obtain a broad measure of anti-sociality. We conducted this experiment with a sample of 200 respondents from the Kibera and Viwandani slums, two of Nairobi's largest informal settlements that suffer from both economic hardship and violent crime. This plan outlines our outcomes of interest and econometric approach.

Intervention

Our study utilizes a methodology developed by Mani et al (2013) and adapted to our Kenyan sample to identify the psychological effect of poverty on anti-social behavior in the lab. We presented three hypothetical scenarios to the respondents, which describe a financial problem they might experience. The primes are described in detail in the appendix. Respondents are given 5 minutes per scenario to contemplate about how they might deal with these problems. These scenarios, by touching on financial issues, act as primes that trigger thoughts of the respondent's own economic situation.

Experimental design

Our main specification of interest is the OLS analogue to the analysis conducted in Mani et al. (2013):
4
yi =β0 +β1Ti +β2Richi +β3(Ti ×Richi)+εi (1)
We collect detailed asset ownership information from our respondents and use this information to construct an objective measure of wealth. We construct a weighted asset index and define the dummy variable Richi = 1 if the respondent is above the median of this index. We construct a weighted asset ownership index following the procedure in Anderson (2008). In addition, we will run a basic treatment effects specification to capture the impact of treatment relative to control:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + εi (2)
where yi is the outcome of interest for respondent i. Ti is a treatment indicator that takes the value 1 for respondents that received the “difficult” financial scenario and 0 for those with the “easy” scenario. εiht is the idiosynratic error term, which we assume is serially uncorrelated. Thus, β1 estimates the treatment effect of the poverty prime on each outcome. We are also interested in the treatment effect as it varies across gender. To examine heterogeneous effects, we estimate the following model:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Femalei + β3(Ti × Femalei) + εi (3) Femalei is an indicator for respondent gender that takes the value 1 for females. Therefore,
β3 estimates the differential effect of the treatment for females compared to males.

Design details

Randomization method
Computerized randomization
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
210
Observations
210
Arms
105 treatment, 105 control
Primary outcomes
Poverty primes (randomly assigned treatment) Cantril Self-Anchoring Ladder (a) Current life (b) Life five years from now Ring Task Noise Aversion Task Coin Toss Game Maudsley Violence Questionnaire Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Short)

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Keywords