Non-Linear Public Goods Games

How to cite

Andres, Maximilian. 2021. "Non-Linear Public Goods Games." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007741. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7741-3.0

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Maximilian Andres*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007741
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7741-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-06-07 – 2021-06-18
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C92, H41
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7741

Abstract

I present a theory on non-linear Public Goods. The Game has a continuum of Nash equilibria in the interior of strategy space which depend on the degree of curvature and what players belief others will contribute. I will use laboratory experiments to test the theory: average contributions in non-linear Games are higher than in quasi-linear Games.

Intervention

I use a between-subject design to study how diffraction between the Public Good and contribution affects investments in the Public Goods Game. To this aim, I conduct two treatments in the lab: Non-Linear (h = 0.5) and Quasi-Linear (h = 0.99).

Experimental design

Public Goods Game:
Similar to much of the literature, in each of the r=10 rounds each of the n=4 subjects receives an endowment of z=20 points. Thus, Z=80. The decision about how much to contribute to the Public Good in each round m is made simultaneously. The Public Good is multiplied by b=2 and then evenly distributed among all group members. Following each round, subjects receive feedback about their own contribution, the sum of contribution of other's in their group and their own payoff in that round.

I inform subjects about the function G() to ensure that it is common knowledge. To this aim, I explain the formula of the Public Goods Game to subjects and inform them about their payoff from the Public Good given any allocation in the Public Good. In addition, I provide a direct response tool to ensure that subjects understand the structure of the game. Further, I use a quiz to ensure that subjects gain an understanding of the game. I apply an exchange rate between points and euro which ensures that subjects had an incentive to increase their earnings. The subject's final earnings were proportional to their earnings in points, plus a show-up fee.

Treatments:
I use a between-subject design to study how diffraction between the Public Good and contribution affects investments in the Public Goods Game. To this aim, I conduct two treatments in the lab: Non-Linear (h = 0.5) and Quasi-Linear (h = 0.99). I will use results to test the hypothesis: average group contributions in non-linear Games are higher than in quasi-linear Games.

Questionnaire:
As shown in the theory, in the non-linear Public Goods Game, the Nash equilibrium includes what players belief others will contribute. Thus, to elicit beliefs is of some interest. To prevent any contamination of behavior in the Public Goods Game, I elicit beliefs in the tenth round immediately after subjects chose their contribution. I incentives subject's for correct beliefs, but it was small, to avoid hedging.

Design details

Randomization method
Students were recruited randomly via electronic mail that were send to their student mail account.
Randomization unit
Group level randomization for both Non-Linear (h = 0.5) and Quasi-Linear (h = 0.99).
Clusters
I plan to ran 7 sessions per treatment with a minimum of 12 subjects.
Observations
In total, 168 subjects.
Arms
84 subject in Non-Linear and 84 Subjects in Quasi-Linear
Primary outcomes
- group contributions M (sum of contributions per group) - individual contributions m (average of contributions per group)
Secondary outcomes
- individual beliefs b
Sponsors
Name: German Research Foundation (DFG) Grant BR 4180/3-1. Location: Bonn, Germany Url: https://www.dfg.de/en/

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords