Leveraging Patients' Social Networks to Overcome Tuberculosis Under-detection in India
How to cite
Goldberg, Jessica; Macis, Mario; Chintagunta, Pradeep. 2015. "Leveraging Patients' Social Networks to Overcome Tuberculosis Under-detection in India." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0000773. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.773-3.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In India alone, it is estimated that 3.5 million people suffer from Tuberculosis. The under-detection of TB represents a key challenge for health officials in developing countries because the success of any treatment program rests crucially on identifying those who have the disease. We propose to evaluate an approach with the potential to augment and strengthen the WHO’s global strategy for community engagement in the fight against TB. We will explore the use of financial incentives to encourage referrals, and we will focus on a specific community group with unique potential to generate referrals; current patients under treatment for TB. We will conduct a randomized controlled trial to compare the effects of different types of financial incentives to encourage TB patients to refer people from within their social networks for TB screening and testing. We will vary the conditionality of the incentives (“unconditional” and “conditional” incentives), the method of outreach ("peer-to-peer outreach" or "provider promotional visits") and whether the new suspects know who named them (“known referrer” and “anonymous referrer” conditions).
Intervention
In collaboration with Operation ASHA (OpASHA), an Indian NGO that operates 200 community-based DOTS (“Directly Observed Treatment Short Course”) centers in India, we propose to conduct a randomized controlled trial to compare the effectiveness of different types of financial incentives to encourage referrals from current TB patients to new suspects. We will vary (1) the conditionality of the incentives (“unconditional” and “conditional” incentives), (2) whether outreach is led by patients or OpASHA’s health workers (“patient outreach” and “patient provides names” conditions), and (3) whether the new suspects know who named them (“known referrer” and “anonymous referrer” conditions).
The “unconditional” incentive will consist of Rupees (Rs.) 150 offered to current patients for each new suspect they induce to come to the center and get tested for TB. When the reward is fixed, each current patient has an incentive to refer any person who may be willing to be tested, irrespective of whether they know or believe they have TB. The “conditional” incentive treatment will consist of Rs. 100 for each new suspect who comes to the center and gets tested, plus a Rs. 150 bonus if the new suspect tests positive for TB. Comparison of the effect of conditional and unconditional incentives will allow us to determine whether the subjects take advantage of incentives that do not depend on test results, and whether they have concrete information about their contacts’ health.
To separate the effect of current patients’ networks from their ability to deliver information and persuade new suspects to get tested, we will vary whether outreach is led by patients or OpASHA’s health workers. In the “patient outreach” treatment, current patients will be given a set of referral cards and will be told that they will receive the reward if new suspects present at the center with the card and get tested for TB; in the “patient provides names” treatment, current patients will be invited to provide names and contact information of people whom they believe should get tested, and will receive the reward if the new suspect, who will be approached by OpASHA’s health workers, comes to the center and gets tested.
Finally, there will be two versions of the “patient provides names” treatment. In the “known referrer” version, the health workers will reveal to the new suspects who named them, whereas in the “anonymous referrer” version, the name of the referrer will not be revealed to the new suspects. This will allow us to determine the extent to which social stigma is a barrier to referrals. In fact, if social costs are the reason why current patients are reluctant to approach others, anonymity should remove them resulting in more and perhaps more effective referrals.
Experimental design
All of Opertaion ASHA's DOTs centers will be divided into one of the following 9 treatment conditions and a pure control group. All patients attending a given center who have been in treatment for at least two weeks, plus those who recently completed treatment, will be asked to participate in a TB detection scheme under one of the following 9 conditions:
T0: Pure control group: No treatment whatsoever. Current patients will be simply surveyed at baseline. New patients will also be surveyed and asked whether current or previous Operation ASHA patient induced them to get tested and start treatment.
T1: Encouragement to refer new suspects (“CP-gives-out-cards”): Each current patient at these centers will receive ten referral cards and will be invited to give the cards to five different people whom they think should be tested for TB.
T2: Encouragement to provide names of new suspects (“CP-provides-names – referrer revealed”): Each current patient at these centers will be invited to provide names and contact information of people whom they think should be tested for TB. The patients will be told that these individuals will be approached by OpASHA’s health workers, and that their names will be mentioned to the new suspects.
T3: Encouragement to provide names of new suspects (“CP-provides-names – referrer anonymous”): This is the same as T2, except that the current patient will be told that their name will NOT be mentioned to the new suspects.
T4: CP-gives-out-cards + Unconditional Incentives: Current patients in these centers will be offered Rupees (Rs.) 150 for each new patient who brings one of their cards to the center and gets tested for TB.
T5: CP-provides-names/referrer revealed + Unconditional Incentive: Current patients in these centers will be told they will receive Rupees (Rs.) 150 for each new patient of those whose names they provided comes to the center and gets tested for TB.
T6: CP-provides-names/referrer anonymous + Unconditional Incentive: This is the same as T5, except that the current patient will be told that their name will NOT be mentioned to the new suspects.
T7: CP-gives-out-cards + Unconditional Incentive + Conditional Bonus: Current patients in these centers will be offered Rs. 100 for each new patient who brings one of their cards to the center and gets tested; in addition, they will receive a Rs. 150 bonus if the new suspect tests positive for TB.
T8: CP-provides-names/referrer revealed + Unconditional Incentive + Conditional Bonus: Current patients in these centers will be offered Rs. 100 for each new patient of those whose names they provided comes to the center and gets tested for TB; in addition, they will receive a Rs. 150 bonus if the new suspect tests positive for TB.
T9: CP-provides-names/referrer anonymous + Unconditional Incentive + Conditional Bonus: This is the same as T8, except that the current patient will be told that their name will NOT be mentioned to the new suspects.
Design details
Materials
Papers from this trial
- Goldberg, Jessica, Mario Macis, and Pradeep Chintagunta. 2023. "Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 15 (1): 259–91. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20200721
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