How do intentions and outcomes affect reciprocity?

How to cite

WU, JIABIN; He, Simin. 2021. "How do intentions and outcomes affect reciprocity?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007704. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7704-1.0

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JIABIN WU* , Simin He

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007704
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7704-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-05-20 – 2021-08-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7704

Abstract

The proposed study investigates the underlying mechanism for reciprocal behavior in strategic interactions. Previous experiments have found evidence on reciprocity and many theoretical models have been proposed to capture reciprocity in economics, some of which argue that reciprocity depends on intentions, while others argue that it depends on outcomes. However, how exactly reciprocity depends on intentions and outcomes has not been carefully examined because no previous experiments can clearly tease out the two. This paper attempts to experimentally quantify the importance of intentions and outcomes for determining reciprocal behavior and provides guidance for future modelling.

Experimental design

In this experiment, participants will first be randomly matched in pairs and engage in a strategic interaction. First, player 1 can choose between A and B. If player 1 chooses A, player 1 gets x RMB, and player 2 gets y RMB. If player 1 chooses B, both player 1 and player 2 get 2y RMB. x is a number randomly drawn from {y1,y2, y3}, with equal probability. Before the value of x is revealed, player 1 has to determine his/her/their strategy for each possible value of x. For example, player 1’s strategy could be “B if x=y1, and A otherwise.” After player 1 provides a complete strategy to each of the possible value of x, the value of x is revealed, and payoff for both players are finalized according to the strategy of player 1. Note that, when eliciting the complete strategy of player 1 using such a method, player 1 is told that the game is ended after he/she/they makes his/her/their strategy and after number x is drawn. Once the final payoff is realized, player 2 is informed about the complete strategy of player 1 and player 2 in turn can make a choice: player 2 will be asked to allocate z units between player 1 and himself/herself.

At the end of the experiment, the participants will be asked to provide their age, gender and major through a simple questionnaire on the computer screen. This information will be automatically collected into a spreadsheet through a computer program.

Design details

Randomization method
When the subjects are seated, they are randomly matched in pairs by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individual-level randomization
Clusters
No cluster.
Observations
200 subjects.
Arms
There is only one treatment. So sample size is still 200 subjects.
Primary outcomes
There are two main variables. The first one is a menu of choices chosen by the proposer. The second one is the choice of the receiver in response to the choices of the proposer and the chance event.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords