A Voluntary Disclosure Approach to Salary History Ban: Experimental Evidence form the Lab

How to cite

Sariisik, Merve. 2021. "A Voluntary Disclosure Approach to Salary History Ban: Experimental Evidence form the Lab." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007697. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7697-1.0

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Merve Sariisik*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007697
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7697-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-06-07 – 2021-08-31
Countries
United States of America ()
JEL codes
C72, C92, D05, D82, D83
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7697

Abstract

Inspired by the Salary History Bans, we designed a context-free lab experiment for a sender-receiver game to reflect the information transmission through the disclosure or non-disclosure of the past salary to the prospective employer before and after the ban under wage inequality.

Senders (applicants) have a true underlying secret number (type) and a color number (idiosyncratic noise term pertaining to historical factors about the past job) assigned to them each round. The summation of the secret number and the color number creates a message (past salary) that is the only available mean of communication between the sender and the receiver other than staying silent. There are two sender color groups (demographic groups). The color number distribution is right-skewed for one sender color group and left-skewed for the other. The support of the color number distribution has symmetric around 0 support for both groups. Receivers' (prospective employer) payoff increases with the accuracy of the guess, whereas senders' payoff increases with the guess itself.

Our main intervention is changing the information disclosure regime from mandatory disclosure (of the message) to voluntary disclosure.

Our experiment consists of 3 waves, in the first two waves we isolate sender groups in both information transmission regimes to test our behavioral model that is an extension of the cursed equilibrium. In the 3rd wave, we put together the two sender groups in two treatments, one for each information transmission regime for the analysis of sender welfare (guess).

Due to COVID-19 related measures, our experiment is going to be conducted online.

Intervention

We will change the information transmission regime from mandatory disclosure of the message (secret number + noise term) to voluntary disclosure.

Experimental design

We let participants play a sender-receiver game, where the only available mean of communication is a "message" which is the sum of the true type (referred to as the "secret number") and a noise term (referred to as "color number"). The true types are uniformly distributed, wheres the noise term (support symmetric around 0) has a right or left-skewed distribution depending on the group of the sender.

Wave 1:
Treatment #1)mandatory disclosure of the message - sender group has right-skewed noise term
Treatment #2)mandatory disclosure of the message - sender group has left-skewed noise term

Wave 2:
Treatment #3)voluntary disclosure of the message - sender group has left-skewed noise term

Wave3:
Treatment #4)mandatory disclosure of the message - two sender groups in the same treatment
Treatment #5)voluntary disclosure of the message - two sender groups in the same treatment

Design details

Randomization method
Participants in the experiment are randomly allocated to a treatment.
Randomization unit
experimental session & individuals play multiple rounds of the sender-receiver game in the session
Clusters
470 individuals
Observations
7065
Arms
Treatment #1: 72 individuals Treatment #2: 72 individuals Treatment #3: 72 individuals Treatment #4: 127 individuals Treatment #5: 127 individuals
Primary outcomes
mistake (raw) mistake (absolute) guess

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords