Who deserves redistribution?

How to cite

Grieco, Daniela; Cattaneo, Cristina. 2021. "Who deserves redistribution?." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007690. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7690-1.0

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Daniela Grieco* , Cristina Cattaneo

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007690
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7690-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-05-19 – 2021-06-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C71; D63; H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7690

Abstract

We study whether and how people’s willingness to redistribute is affected by the desire to reward recipients’ previous virtuous behavior, namely the sacrifice of own interest for the community’s sake. We explore the role of recipients’ cooperative levels in making them “deserving” redistribution. An additional objective of the analysis is to study the correlation between own cooperative behavior and redistribution levels.

Intervention

We collect information on real redistributive choices and provide subjects with information on recipients’ behavior in a binary Public Goods Game.

Experimental design

Our experimental protocol combines the infrastructure of an online “labor market” to recruit Workers and that of the international survey company to recruit Spectators. First, we recruit Workers on a online labor market. In Phase 1, Workers take part into a binary Public Goods Game. In Phase 2, Workers conduct a real-effort work task made of four assignments (a scrambling task, two math tasks, and a code recognition task). We measure their performance in all the four tasks and randomly match them in pairs.
The Spectators are asked to choose the amount of the redistribution between the two workers in each pair in different conditions, where we vary the information provided regarding the Workers’ behavior in the Public Goods Game.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by the company that administers the survey.
Randomization unit
Individual. We present the control condition, where no information is given about Workers' behavior in the Public Goods Game, as first, given that it only presents a limited information set. The other four conditions, that add information about the Workers' behavior (both Workers decided to cooperate; no Worker decided to cooperate; only the most productive decided to to cooperate; only the less productive decided to cooperate), will be presented in a random order. To check any anchoring effect to the responses in the control condition, a sub-set of Spectators will not receive the control condition.
Clusters
1000 subjects
Observations
1000 subjects
Arms
All 1000 subjects receive the four conditions in a randomized order ("within-subject design").
Primary outcomes
Redistribution choices

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords