We study preference-aggregation and paternalistic-intervention decisions of elected politicians and how they compare to decisions of “the people” they represent. We make use of paradigms developed in laboratory research by Ambuehl et al. (2021) and Ambuehl and Bernheim (2021) in a survey with federal and state politicians in Germany and a population sample to observe how the two groups resolve these two common normative questions of welfare economics. Thereby, we plan to understand whether and why politicians differ in the way they aggregate others' preferences and choose paternalistically from "the people". If there are differences between the politicians' normative choices and those made by members of the electorate, a question is whether representative Germans are happy to delegate such choices to politicians, or whether they would instead prefer them to be made by less highly selected members of the German population. This question is addressed using delegation choices of the electorate.
Experimental design
We compare elected politicians to "the people" in terms of the their preference-aggregation and paternalistic-intervention decisions.
Design details
Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
Number of cluster = number of individuals in our surveys (see below)
Observations
1800 - 2100 in survey + unknown number of elected politicians
Arms
600 - 700 in Survey 1 ("Similar to politicians")
600 - 700 in Survey 2 (Aggregation decisions and delegation)
600 - 700 in Survey 3 (Paternalistic decisions and delegation)
Survey 1 with politicians: survey sent to all federal and state members of parliament (response quota unknown ex-ante)
Primary outcomes
Aggregation decisions - convexity / concavity and Scoring vs. Condortcet, as analyzed in Ambuehl & Bernheim (2021)
Paternalistic interventions - yes/no and strictness of the intervention, measured as maximal amount that can be chosen early + Reaction to front-end delay as analyzed in Ambuehl et al. (2021)
How do beliefs about cardinal utility / disutility of aggregation options correspond to concavity of scoring rule used?
How do beliefs about Chooser's unrestricted choices correspond to the paternalistic interventions imposed?
Secondary outcomes
Delegation decisions (only population sample) - delegation of aggregation/paternalistic decisions to politicians or members of the population with / without the same demographic characteristics as elected politicians.
How does support for real world paternalistic interventions correlate with the laboratory-type measures?
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