Individual trust and trustworthy behaviours in differentiated organisational structures

How to cite

Pang, Yudan; Wu, Hang. 2021. "Individual trust and trustworthy behaviours in differentiated organisational structures." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007687. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7687-1.0

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Yudan Pang* , Hang Wu

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007687
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7687-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-05-30 – 2021-07-01
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D230
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7687

Abstract

This experiment is mainly based on the classical trust game.
The main aim of this experiment is to explore the trusting and trustworthy behavior in different organizational structures. We would like to test whether the different organizational structures will influence the trustor's trusting behavior and the trustee's truthworthiness.
The experiment contains five experimental groups.
We introduce different organizational structures in the trustees' groups. We used a 2×2 experiment design: parallel × vertical organizational structures, balanced in-group power × unbalanced in-group power. There are five different experiment groups in our design: 1. parallel-balanced, 2. parallel-unbalanced, 3. vertical-balanced, 4. vertical-unbalanced (from high to low), 5. vertical-unbalanced (from low to high).
In each experiment unit, there are three participants, including one trustor and two trustees. The trustors will receive 10 EC when the experiment starts. First, the trustors have to decide the investment number to the trustee group. The investment number range is { 4, 6, 8, 10 } (EC). Then, the investment money will become 3 times the original investment and be given to the trustees. In the parallel groups, trustees will decide the return value at the same time, while in the parallel, one trustee makes a decision in advance, and then the other trustee could see her decision result and then makes her own decision. In the power-balanced groups, two trustees receive an equal amount of investment money, both 1.5 times of the original investment money that the trustor provides. In the power-unbalanced groups, one trustee receives 2 times the original investment money and is assigned as the "high power" trustee, while another trustee receives the investment money equal to the original investment money that the trustor provides and is assigned as the "low power" trustee. The trustor receives the return money from two trustees.
This experiment repeats for 30 periods. The participants' experimental role changes every 10 periods and would not be repeated. It means that each participant will act in all kinds of experimental roles in a unit. In treatment 4, the trustee with low power acts in advance, and in treatment 5, the trustee with high power acts in advance.

Intervention

The experiment includes five experimental groups. Each group has a different organizational structure or power balance status. In order to make different organizational structures, the trustees in experimental units are structured as parallel or vertical structures. The differences are constructed with trustees' decision procedures. In the parallel structure, two trustees make their decision at the same time, while in the vertical structure, one trustee in an experimental unit makes a decision in advance, and then another trustee makes a decision. The differences of power balance status are structured with the investment money each trustee could receive. In the balanced groups, each trustee receives an equal amount of investment money from the trustor. In the unbalanced groups, one trustee receives a higher amount of investment money while another trustee receives a lower amount of investment.

Experimental design

This experiment is mainly based on the classical trust game. We introduce different organizational structures in the trustees' groups. We used a 2×2 experiment design: parallel × vertical organizational structures, balanced in-group power × unbalanced in-group power. There are five different experiment groups in our design: 1. parallel-balanced, 2. parallel-unbalanced, 3. vertical-balanced, 4. vertical-unbalanced (from high to low), 5. vertical-unbalanced (from low to high).
In each experiment unit, there are three participants, including one trustor and two trustees. The trustors will receive 10 EC when the experiment starts. First, the trustors have to decide the investment number to the trustee group. The investment number range is { 4, 6, 8, 10 } (EC). Then, the investment money will become 3 times the original investment and be given to the trustees. In the parallel groups, trustees will decide the return value at the same time, while in the parallel, one trustee makes decision in advance and then the other trustee could see her decision result and then makes own decision. In the power-balanced groups, two trustees receive equal amount of investment money, both 1.5 times of the original investment money that trustor provides. In the power-unbalanced groups, one trustee receives 2 times of the original investment money and is assigned as the "high power" trustee, while another trustee receives the investment money equal to the original investment money that the trustor provides and is assigned as the "low power" trustee. The trustor receives the return money from two trustees.
This experiment repeats for 30 periods. The participants' experimental role changes every 10 periods and would not be repeated. It means that each participant will act in all kinds of experimental roles in a unit. In treatment 4, the trustee with low power acts in advance, and in treatment 5, the trustee with high power acts in advance.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
1 university
Observations
150-180 university students
Arms
30-36 participants in treatment 1, 30-36 participants in treatment 2, 30-36 participants in treatment 3, 30-36 participants in treatment 4, and 30-36 participants in treatment 5.
Primary outcomes
trustor's investment value, trustee's return value, differences of investment and return values between periods, individual's total profit, belief to others

Cited by

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Keywords