Real-effort laboratory experiment on the effects of production uncertainty on agent effort allocation among two inputs.
How to cite
Phipps, Aaron. 2021. "Real-effort laboratory experiment on the effects of production uncertainty on agent effort allocation among two inputs.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007665. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7665-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Incentives in complex jobs — like education and health— have had mixed results in developed countries. Both these jobs have complex production functions. One way to describe job production complexity is by allowing agents to have uncertainty about how their inputs translate into productivity. When coupled with large output incentives, such uncertainty can induce agents to inefficiently shift their effort allocation to inputs with lower uncertainty, even at the cost of reducing average output. This experiment tests that hypothesis using a two-input real effort lab experiment. Participants are paid based on the number of easy and hard math questions they answer correctly. In treatment, I increase the uncertainty about the marginal payoff for inputs. The experiment is intended to test whether increased marginal uncertainty induces agents to inefficiently switch their effort allocation.
Intervention
Participants use a web browser to engage in addition tasks while a proctor controls the flow of the experiment in an administrative dashboard. The basic innovation is to present participants with a choice of two possible tasks (inputs). In the allowed time, they attempt to successfully complete either task as many times as possible. The two tasks have different difficulty and financial payoffs.
Experimental design
Each participant is presented both a control session and a treatment session (in randomized order). In treatment, the payoffs for each input are randomized. There are two treatment arms: one in which the easy question's payoffs have high variance, and the other in which the hard question's payoffs have high variance.
Design details
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