Keep your eyes on the prize: How to make penalty contracts work 2

How to cite

Essl, Andrea; Bieberstein, Frauke von; Jaussi, Stefanie. 2021. "Keep your eyes on the prize: How to make penalty contracts work 2." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007650. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7650-1.2

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Andrea Essl* , Frauke von Bieberstein , Stefanie Jaussi

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007650
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7650-1.2
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-05-01 – 2022-06-30
Countries
Switzerland (), United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7650

Abstract

This online experiment examines the influence of payment modalities on productivity when working under framed incentive contracts. We investigate the effect of payment visualization to make the payment situation more salient to the participants. We employ a 2x2 design with four different treatments varying the incentive contract (bonus vs. penalty) and the visualization (visualized vs. description only). Participants work on a real effort task. At the end, one task is randomly selected for payment. If the selected task is solved correctly, participants in the bonus treatment receive an additional payment. In the penalty treatment, participants receive a higher payment upfront, but can lose part of it, if the selected task is solved incorrectly. Both contracts are payoff-equivalent. We vary whether the payment options are visualized on screen with dollar bills and coins, or are only explained using a verbal description.

Intervention

Online experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 2x2 between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the individual level. In the main stage of the Bonus treatments the payment specifies a base pay plus a bonus if the individual solves the randomly selected task correctly. In the main stage of the Penalty treatments the payment specifies a higher base pay including the incentive pay, which has to be paid back (penalty) if the individual solves the selected task incorrectly. Both contracts are payoff-equivalent. In the Visualization treatments images of USD bills / coins are shown on screen. In the Verbal treatments a verbal explanation without visualization of the possible outcomes is used.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of three parts and a questionnaire. In Part 1, we assess loss aversion based on a lottery task. In Part 2, participants receive a fixed wage and work on a real effort encryption task (Encryption task with Double Randomization). Participants have to encode letters into numbers and can proceed with the next word only if they encoded all letters correctly. Effort is measured as the number of solved words. In Part 3, the main stage of the experiment, participants work on the same encryption task. This time, payment is performance based and tied to a randomly selected task. Depending on the treatment, the payment is framed as a bonus or penalty and the payment is visualized or not visualized (see above).

Design details

Randomization method
computer (online experiment)
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
The number of participants planned for the experiment is 1440 people completing the study. We advertise for 1600 participants to take into account individuals excluded due to the restrictions below. We will exclude subjects who do not complete the MTurk study within 60 minutes of starting and who are not approved for any other reason (e.g. not having a valid MTurk ID); We will analyze the data both, for all participants and for those participants, who skip all or most of the tasks solve at least one task correctly. In addition, and in line with previous research, we will analyze the data once excluding those who make inconsistent decisions in the loss aversion test and once including these subjects. The study will be kept open on MTurk until 1600 subjects have completed the assignment.
Observations
The number of participants planned for the experiment is 1440 people completing the study. We advertise for 1600 participants to take into account individuals excluded due to the restrictions below.
Arms
About 400 participants per treatment (about 360 participants per treatment after excluding participants as described above)
Primary outcomes
Productivity measured as the number of correct answers in the real-effort task.
Secondary outcomes
Skipping behavior measured as the number of skipped tasks in Part 3; number of incorrectly answers in the real-effort task

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords