Seeking the Truth: Designing a Performance Incentive, Auditing, and Reporting System for Local Bureaucrats

How to cite

Brownstone, Steven. 2021. "Seeking the Truth: Designing a Performance Incentive, Auditing, and Reporting System for Local Bureaucrats." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007558. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7558-1.0

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Steven Brownstone*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007558
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7558-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-01-26 – 2022-04-26
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7558

Abstract

Understanding how to improve the performance of frontline bureaucrats is critical, since they are ultimately responsible for the delivery of public services and the implementation of nearly all development programs. Adopting private sector management practices like performance-based incentives is challenging with frontline bureaucrats, since they often collect the data that is used to assess their performance and serve multiple policy objectives. We partner with a government department of an Indian state to redesign their performance assessment and data collection systems, and leverage this setting to experimentally study how incentives for performance and truthful reporting dynamically shape bureaucrat performance and truthfulness.

Intervention

Treatment A provides panchayat secretaries (PSes) performance-based feedback via a scorecard page in the application that shows the PSes their absolute level of performance, highlights areas for improvement, and conveys relative performance within the district.

Treatment B informs PSes that their self-reported performance data will be “truthed” by comparing it against the findings of inspections by the mandal panchayat officer (MPO) (the PS’s boss), and significant deviations will be penalised. This is operationalized by a truth score page within their reporting application. The page will inform PSes whether their data quality has been flagged and why.

Treatment C provides the same data quality flags to the MPOs, in addition to the data quality flags to the PSes, based on data reported by third party auditors.

Experimental design

Initially 75% of mandals will receive treatment A. After approximately two months, 50% of mandals will receive treatment A. After approximately 4 months, the control mandals will receive treatment A. After approximately 6 months, the 50% of mandals that had been receiving treatment B will receive treatment C and the remaining will receive treatment B. The exact timeline is dependent on the decisions of our government partners.

Design details

Randomization method
All 539 mandals in Telangana were randomly assigned to one of four groups. The randomization was stratified by district and the number of GPs per mandal within the district. Specifically, within each district the mandals were grouped into groups of 4 by size; these quartets were randomized. The remainder mandals in each district were randomized to minimize treatment imbalances within each district. After randomization, 34 smaller mandals had their MPOs re-assigned to help inspect GPs in 32 large mandals. Of these re-assignments 5 mandals crossed treatment groups. The 5 mandals where the assignment crossed treatment groups will be excluded from the analysis when the analysis covers periods where the mandals had different treatments.
Randomization unit
Mandal which is the administrative unit above the gram panchayat. An MPO is responsible for the PSes within a mandal.
Clusters
539 mandals
Observations
We hope to sample 9 gram panchayats in each mandal every two month measurement cycle.
Arms
134 mandals initially control, 405 mandals initially treatment A. Then, 134 control, 135 treatment A, 270 treatment B. Then 269 treatment A and 270 treatment B. Finally, 269 treatment B and 270 treatment C.
Primary outcomes
The primary endpoint is the change in the performance score calculated from the third party auditor’s inspections using the department’s importance weights for each audited indicator.
Secondary outcomes
Citizen satisfaction with PS services from phone survey MPO subjective ranking of PS quality from phone survey Sarpanch subjective satisfaction with PS. Per-capita expenditures at the GP

Cited by

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Keywords