Reciprocating Preferences in Matching Markets

How to cite

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph. 2021. "Reciprocating Preferences in Matching Markets." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007551. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7551-2.1

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Timm Opitz* , Christoph Schwaiger

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007551
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7551-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2021-06-17 – 2022-04-30
Countries
Germany ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7551

Abstract

Matching markets intend to form mutually beneficial stable relationships. The stability criterion guarantees that no participant can benefit from breaking up a formed match. Under the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA), matches ought to be stable. This result builds on the assumptions of strict and invariable preference orders under complete information. Empirical evidence on whether preferences actually meet these assumptions is lacking. In a theory-guided laboratory experiment, we test whether agents have reciprocating preferences. We hypothesize that agents prefer to interact with someone who prefers interacting with them. Hence, agents adjust their own preference ranking once they know how other participants ranked them. We document how this affects the stability of the DA, investigate subsequent cooperation behavior in the formed teams and discriminate between belief-based and preference-based explanation for preference changes. This contributes to the literature on the design and robustness of (centralized) matching markets.

Intervention

We compare behavior under two information structures in a between-subject design In the baseline condition (No-Info), participants never know how their potential (and actual) partners rank them. In the treatment condition (Info), participants do receive the information how they are ranked before submitting their final preference list. This allows them to incorporate this information into their own preferences and gives them the option to adjust behavior in the PGG based on their knowledge of how much their partner wanted to do be matched with them.

Experimental design

The experiment consists of a team-formation process and a PGG that is played within the formed dyads. Teams are formed through a centralized matching mechanism. The underlying preferences of players are based on self-reported questionnaire information of the potential partners. After being matched with one of the potential partners, participants play the PGG with the (known) partner. During the team-formation process, players interact within matching groups. We study a setting of two-sided matching in a one-to-one market. Hence, half of the players within each matching group take the role of proposers, half the role of receivers. Within each experimental session, there will be multiple matching groups, each consisting of 8 participants. To increase statistical power, we reshuffle matching groups 4 times. No proposer will interact with the same receiver twice and vice versa. [Detailed information on the design can be found in the pre-analysis plan.]

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization of (online) laboratory participants by o-Tree (computer).
Randomization unit
Individual (student).
Clusters
320 students.
Observations
320 students. Number of observations depends on outcome (some analysis on the matching group level, other analysis at the individual level + repetitions). [Detailed information on the number of observations for each outcome can be found in the pre-analysis plan.]
Arms
160 students in Info, 160 students in No-Info
Primary outcomes
- Stability of the matching outcome [Hypothesis 1 in pre-analysis plan.] - Behavior in the PGG (unconditional cooperation behavior) [Hypothesis 4 in pre-analysis plan.]
Secondary outcomes
- Individual preference changes [Hypothesis 2+3 in pre-analysis plan.] - Behavior and Beliefs in the PGG (conditional cooperation behavior and beliefs about others' contributions) [Hypothesis 5-7 in pre-analysis plan.]

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Keywords