Impact of COVID-19 Stimulus Packages on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
How to cite
Undurraga, Raimundo; Higgins, Sean; Gertler, Paul J.; Parrado, Eric; Montoya, Ana María. 2021. "Impact of COVID-19 Stimulus Packages on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007534. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7534-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis in Latin America hinges on the survival of SMEs, which employ a large fraction of the region’s workforce. Governments are responding with large economic stimulus packages, including liquidity or methods to prop up demand for SMEs. We are evaluating the impact of randomly offering loans to SMEs within the framework of the Chilean Government COVID-19 support program. The researchers hope to understand what might be preventing firms from taking up these services and to quantify the impact of pandemic-specific protections and relief on firm profits, survival, and employment.
Intervention
A Chilean bank randomly offers credits to SMEs. Credits are supported by the stimulus package designed by the Chilean Government.
Experimental design
We will be working with potential and actual SME clients of a Chilean bank. Firms are divided in the following three eligible groups, with roughly 10,000 firms in total:
i) Firms that were contacted in the last credit campaign to face the current crisis, and that requested credit but may need more credit now;
ii) Firms that were contacted in the last credit campaign to face the current crisis, and that did not requested credit but but may need credit now;
iii) Firms that requested a loan but were rejected / not pre-selected by the bank in the last credit campaign. In particular, these are firms that were at the credit rejection limit, that is, firms that would have been approved for the loan they requested if the scoring criteria for accepting a loan had been marginally more flexible.
The experiment works as follows:
1) 50% of the firms will be randomly assigned to the treatment (encouraged) group and 50% of them to the control (non-encouraged) group.
2) Treatment-group firms will be informed by text messages, phone, and/or emails regarding the existence of credit opportunities offered by the bank within the framework of the relief program designed by Chilean government. The bank will offer them as many administrative facilities as possible to convince them to actually apply for credit and complete the loan application. Control firms will not be either informed not helped to apply for credit.
3) Treatment (encouraged) firms that apply for credit will be offered a loan. Control-group (non-encouraged) firms can apply to credits by their own means, and the bank will not a priori deny them access to credit.
Design details
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