Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment

How to cite

Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela. 2021. "Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007468. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7468-2.0

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Thomas Rittmannsberger* , Philipp Lergetporer , Silvia Angerer , Daniela Glätzle-Rützler

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007468
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7468-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2021-04-09 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C93
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7468

Abstract

The human ability to establish cooperation depends upon the execution of cooperative norms, especially in large groups of unrelated strangers. High levels of cooperation among humans are often attributed to the possibility of third-party punishment (TPP). We study the effectiveness of TTP to increase cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game in a representative sample of the German population. Our study aims to answer whether TTP fosters cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in society at large.

Intervention

We investigate whether cooperation rates increase through the implementation of a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism. Therefore, we plan to run a large-scale artefactual field experiment with a national representative sample of the German population, where participants play an incentivized prisoners dilemma (PD) game.
To do so, we run two experimental treatments. In the first treatment, there is no TPP, while in the second treatment, TPP is possible. We randomly divide all subjects into two groups. The first group is assigned to the first treatment and plays the PD game without TPP, while the second group is assigned to the second treatment and plays the PD game with TPP.

Experimental design

We plan to sample a minimum of 2,000 adults aged between 18 and 69 years (up to a maximum of 3,000 — conditional on pending supplementary research funding; also see “Experiment characteristics”).
The experiment is conducted in cooperation with a survey institute. The recruitment and polling are managed by the survey institute, which collects the data via an online platform. That is, our participants participate in the experiment autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is carried out by the survey institute at the individual level, using a computer. Payment of incentives is carried out anonymously by the survey institute.
Our experiment is structured as follows:
Respondents will be randomly assigned (between subject) to Treatment 1 (p=0.5), or Treatment 2 (p=0.5).

Treatment 1:
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behaviour of the partner
Stage 3: Punishment Decision
Stage 4: Beliefs about the behaviour of the player

Treatment 2:
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behaviour of the partner
Stage 3: Beliefs about the behaviour of the observer

Design details

Randomization method
(e.g. public lottery, randomization done in office by a computer, coin flip): Randomization is carried out by the survey company, using a computer.
Randomization unit
at the individual level
Clusters
2,000 individuals (adults aged between 18 and 69 years). (maximum: 3,000 – conditional on pending supplementary research funding )
Observations
2,000 individuals (1,000 per treatment). (maximum: 3,000 (1,500/1,500) – conditional on pending supplementary research funding ). According to our conservative cost calculations, we have sufficient funding for sampling 2,000 individuals. In case that we are granted supplementary research funding, we envisage to continue sampling up to a maximum number of 3,000 individuals.
Arms
1,000 per treatment. (maximum: 1,500 – conditional on pending supplementary research funding).
Primary outcomes
Cooperation rate in the PD game, that is, the percentage of participants who decide to send their endowment to their partner.
Secondary outcomes
We will investigate effect heterogeneities by age, gender, and socioeconomic status, as well as whether respondents answered the control questions correctly. Furthermore, we will investigate the correlation between cooperation and punishment decisions and survey-based measures of real-life cooperative and punishment decisions in the context of Covid-19 vaccination decisions.

Cited by

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Keywords