Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment
How to cite
Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela. 2021. "Cooperation and punishment in a nationwide experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007468. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7468-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The human ability to establish cooperation depends upon the execution of cooperative norms, especially in large groups of unrelated strangers. High levels of cooperation among humans are often attributed to the possibility of third-party punishment (TPP). We study the effectiveness of TTP to increase cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game in a representative sample of the German population. Our study aims to answer whether TTP fosters cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in society at large.
Intervention
We investigate whether cooperation rates increase through the implementation of a third-party punishment (TPP) mechanism. Therefore, we plan to run a large-scale artefactual field experiment with a national representative sample of the German population, where participants play an incentivized prisoners dilemma (PD) game.
To do so, we run two experimental treatments. In the first treatment, there is no TPP, while in the second treatment, TPP is possible. We randomly divide all subjects into two groups. The first group is assigned to the first treatment and plays the PD game without TPP, while the second group is assigned to the second treatment and plays the PD game with TPP.
Experimental design
We plan to sample a minimum of 2,000 adults aged between 18 and 69 years (up to a maximum of 3,000 — conditional on pending supplementary research funding; also see “Experiment characteristics”).
The experiment is conducted in cooperation with a survey institute. The recruitment and polling are managed by the survey institute, which collects the data via an online platform. That is, our participants participate in the experiment autonomously on their own digital devices. Randomization is carried out by the survey institute at the individual level, using a computer. Payment of incentives is carried out anonymously by the survey institute.
Our experiment is structured as follows:
Respondents will be randomly assigned (between subject) to Treatment 1 (p=0.5), or Treatment 2 (p=0.5).
Treatment 1:
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behaviour of the partner
Stage 3: Punishment Decision
Stage 4: Beliefs about the behaviour of the player
Treatment 2:
Stage 1: Cooperation
Stage 2: Beliefs about the behaviour of the partner
Stage 3: Beliefs about the behaviour of the observer
Design details
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