An economic experiment: Enhancing the Capital gains tax on property compliance.
How to cite
Katreniak, Dagmara Celik; Rybosova, Petra; Tuzilova, Berenika; Priesol, Richard; Cingl, Lubomir. 2021. "An economic experiment: Enhancing the Capital gains tax on property compliance.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007464. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7464-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
For many countries and public institutions, efficient tax collection is essential for their existence. Even though their tax codes seem always complete and precise in specifying terms and procedures of tax collections, in reality there often exists space for improvements. In Slovakia, if a property is sold within five years from its acquisition, the Capital gains tax on property (further just “Tax”) should be paid. The Tax should be self-reported by taxpayers in an annual tax report for the year in which the property was sold, which opens space for evasion.
In this project, we cooperate with the Financial Administration Slovak Republic and aim at increasing the Tax collections by sending informative letters to the potential evaders that remind them of their obligations. We test several text versions of the letter that may improve the rate of response, each appealing to certain personal motivation. To shed light on what type of information motivates people the most, five variations of the letter were created on top of a baseline letter and were combined orthogonally in a 2x4 manner.
Intervention
In this project, we cooperate with Financial Administration Slovak Republic (TASR) and aim at increasing the Tax collections by sending informative letters to the potential evaders that remind them of their obligations. We test several text versions of the letter that may improve the rate of response, each appealing to certain personal motivation. To shed light on what type of information motivates people the most, five variations of the letter were created on top of a baseline letter and were combined orthogonally in a 2x4 manner.
Experimental design
The study includes four closely related experiments that differ with respect to (i) repayment period and (ii) the nature of the subject pool. First, we aim at the taxpayers who sold their property more than one year ago, and thus the period for reporting has already expired (the “ex-post” experiment), and at the taxpayers who sold their property in the last year and are supposed to report it in the current standard reporting period (the “ex-ante” experiment). The second dimension consists of whether the recipient is an individual or spouses selling a jointly owned property.
The treatments T1-T4 consist of presenting different information in one extra paragraph in the middle of the front page of the cover letter. The first treatment (T1) provides information about the probability of being audited, as it may deter tax evasion (Bérgolo et al., 2017); the second (T2) describes the structure of fees for late payment, which can also improve tax compliance (Castro & Scartascini, 2015; De Neve et al., 2019); the third (T3) contains moral suasion inspired by Bott et al. (2019); and the last one (T4) contains a sentence reframing the act of non-payment as a commission rather than omission (Hallsworth et al., 2015). Finally, in an orthogonal treatment (B) we provide the recipients with an extra leaflet that contains a flow-chart aiming to simplify the decision-making situation and help them find out whether they are exempt or not. The selection of the treatments reflects the interests of the TASR. Two control groups are introduced - first, a control group whose group members receive the baseline letter, and second, no-letter control group, whose members do not receive any letter at all.
Design details
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