An economic experiment: Enhancing the Capital gains tax on property compliance.

How to cite

Katreniak, Dagmara Celik; Rybosova, Petra; Tuzilova, Berenika; Priesol, Richard; Cingl, Lubomir. 2021. "An economic experiment: Enhancing the Capital gains tax on property compliance.." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0007464. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7464-1.0

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Dagmara Celik Katreniak* , Petra Rybosova , Berenika Tuzilova , Richard Priesol , Lubomir Cingl

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0007464
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7464-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2021-02-23 – 2021-09-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
H24, H26
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/7464

Abstract

For many countries and public institutions, efficient tax collection is essential for their existence. Even though their tax codes seem always complete and precise in specifying terms and procedures of tax collections, in reality there often exists space for improvements. In Slovakia, if a property is sold within five years from its acquisition, the Capital gains tax on property (further just “Tax”) should be paid. The Tax should be self-reported by taxpayers in an annual tax report for the year in which the property was sold, which opens space for evasion.
In this project, we cooperate with the Financial Administration Slovak Republic and aim at increasing the Tax collections by sending informative letters to the potential evaders that remind them of their obligations. We test several text versions of the letter that may improve the rate of response, each appealing to certain personal motivation. To shed light on what type of information motivates people the most, five variations of the letter were created on top of a baseline letter and were combined orthogonally in a 2x4 manner.

Intervention

In this project, we cooperate with Financial Administration Slovak Republic (TASR) and aim at increasing the Tax collections by sending informative letters to the potential evaders that remind them of their obligations. We test several text versions of the letter that may improve the rate of response, each appealing to certain personal motivation. To shed light on what type of information motivates people the most, five variations of the letter were created on top of a baseline letter and were combined orthogonally in a 2x4 manner.

Experimental design

The study includes four closely related experiments that differ with respect to (i) repayment period and (ii) the nature of the subject pool. First, we aim at the taxpayers who sold their property more than one year ago, and thus the period for reporting has already expired (the “ex-post” experiment), and at the taxpayers who sold their property in the last year and are supposed to report it in the current standard reporting period (the “ex-ante” experiment). The second dimension consists of whether the recipient is an individual or spouses selling a jointly owned property.
The treatments T1-T4 consist of presenting different information in one extra paragraph in the middle of the front page of the cover letter. The first treatment (T1) provides information about the probability of being audited, as it may deter tax evasion (Bérgolo et al., 2017); the second (T2) describes the structure of fees for late payment, which can also improve tax compliance (Castro & Scartascini, 2015; De Neve et al., 2019); the third (T3) contains moral suasion inspired by Bott et al. (2019); and the last one (T4) contains a sentence reframing the act of non-payment as a commission rather than omission (Hallsworth et al., 2015). Finally, in an orthogonal treatment (B) we provide the recipients with an extra leaflet that contains a flow-chart aiming to simplify the decision-making situation and help them find out whether they are exempt or not. The selection of the treatments reflects the interests of the TASR. Two control groups are introduced - first, a control group whose group members receive the baseline letter, and second, no-letter control group, whose members do not receive any letter at all.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization unit
In the two experiments with individual owners, we randomized the subsample at the individual level. In the other two experiments with joint owners we used households as our clusters and we randomized the subsample at household level.
Clusters
We have 1,365 spouses in the ex-post experiment who sold a property more than one year ago and 686 spouses in the ex-ante experiment who sold a property in the last year.
Observations
The target sample of the ex-post experiment is 8,254 individuals who sold the property more than one year ago. The sample of individuals who sold a property less than one year ago in the ex-ante experiment includes 3,969 taxpayers. The sample of spouses in the ex-post experiment which sold a property more than one year ago includes 1,365 couples and the sample of spouses in the ex-ante experiment who sold a property in the last year includes 686 couples. In each of these four experiments, we include a separate control group that receives no letter.
Arms
The natural goal of the TASR is to maximize the chance and value of the (re)payment of the Tax and therefore their preference was to minimize the size of the control group which does not get any letter. The size of the control (no-letter) group is different across the four scenarios: in the ex-post experiment it is 5% of individuals and 15% of households and in the ex-ante experiment 10% of individuals and 20% of households. The proportion of people selected for the control group depended on a) the expected proportion of control-group people who would pay the capital gains tax once the letters are sent (we expect no or a minimal number of individuals/households (spouses) in the ex-post experiment to pay without any reminder, and approximately 30% of the individuals/spouses in the ex-ante experiment), and on b) the minimum treatment effect size we would be able to detect given the resulting treatment-control proportions. The overall sample size was determined as the total number of taxpayers identified by the TASR as potential evaders. The final number of addresses per experiment and treatment cells are shown in Table 1. The total sample size per experiment, the control/treatment proportions, and the minimum detectable treatment effects based on power calculations are presented in Table 2. Within the treatment group, people had equal chances to be selected into any of the treatment cells. We stratified all treatment cells using multiple observable characteristics (gender, age below/above 45, disposable income below/above 25k€, tax base higher/lower 10k€, employment type, and subjects’ residency in case of experiments with individuals; and gender, age group, tax base, and disposable income in case of experiments with spouses) to strengthen the randomization balance. Table 1: Randomization and the list of hypotheses (see the attached Analysis plan)
Primary outcomes
On the extensive margin, the primary outcome variable is whether individuals or joint owners decide to pay the Capital gains tax. On the intensive margin, the primary variable of interest is the amount of the tax paid from the capital gains. We will test for the existence of gender differences in the measures.

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